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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Der Erfolg von vielen sozialen Interaktionen hängt davon ab, ob
Menschen bereit sind, sich ethisch und prosozial zu verhalten. Die
Bereitschaft, eigenes Interesse zugunsten anderer zurückzustellen,
führt zu Wohlstandsgewinn und Fortschritt der Gesellschaft. Unet-
hisches und antisoziales Verhalten hingegen führen zu Wohlstands-
verlusten und Zerstörung.
Diese Doktorarbeit enthält drei Labor-Experimente, in denen die
speziﬁschen Faktoren, die ethisches und pro-soziales Verhalten von
Menschen beeinﬂussen, untersucht werden.
Diese Zusammenfassung beschreibt die Entwicklung des For-
schungsrahmens und die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der Doktorarbeit.
Forschungsansätze
Von einkommensverteilungsbasierten Präferenzen bis Selbst-
bildbewahrung
Jahrelange Wirtschaftsforschung hat die Prämisse vom Homo öco-
nomicus in Frage gestellt. In vielen klassischen Experimenten (Dik-
tatorspiel, Vertrauensspiel, Kollektivgutspiel) verhalten sich die Men-
schen so, dass sie bereit sind, ihre Vergütung zu opfern, um den
Zustand der Anderen zu ändern. Dieses Verhalten reizte die For-
scher, die sogenannten sozialen Präferenzen in die Wirtschaftstheo-
rie zu intergrieren (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Ockenfels & Bolton, 2000;
Charness & Rabin, 2002). Laut dieser Modelle kümmern sich die
Menschen nicht nur um ihr eigenes Wohlbeﬁnden, sondern auch um
ihren Abstand von dem Verdienst der Anderen. Ungleichheitsaver-
sion wurde als die Erklärung von solchen 'Anomalien' wie Abgaben
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im Diktatorspiel oder Ablehnungen von geringen Beträgen im Ulti-
matumspiel angeführt. Diese einkommensverteilungsbasierten Mo-
delle wurden später mit der Idee von erwartungsabhängigem Ver-
halten erweitert: die Menschen nehmen nicht nur die Konsequenzen,
sondern auch die Erwartungen der Anderen wahr. Das Paradig-
ma von Schuldaversion (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli
& Dufwenberg, 2007) hat es ermöglicht, die Rolle von negativen
Emotionen aufgrund der zerstörten Erwartungen der Anderen di-
rekt zu modellieren. Die Forscher haben bemerkt, dass die Möglich-
keit, die Erwartungen der Anderen gering zu halten (und trotzdem
als 'fair' zu erscheinen), stark das prosoziale Verhalten reduziert
(Gueth et al., 1996; Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Lazear et al.,
2012). Der 'soziale Druck' widersprach der inneren Motivation, sich
pro-sozial zu verhalten. Neben 'fairness' (einkommensverteilungsba-
sierte Modelle), den Erwartungen der Anderen (erwartungsabhän-
gige Modelle) oder sozialem Druck spielen die eigenen Standards der
Menschen eine große Role bei sozialem Verhalten, so die Theorien
von Selbstbildbewahrung (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Mazar et al.,
2008; Benabou & Tirole, 2011; Dana et al., 2007). Aus Sicht der
Theorie von Selbstbildbewahrung rechtfertigen die Eigenschaften
der Umgebung egoistisches Verhalten, so lange das Selbstbild be-
wahrt ist.
Dana et al. (2007) illustriert, wie die Eigenschaften der Umge-
bung das Resultat der sozialen Interaktion nach der Selbstbildar-
gumentation beinﬂussen. Im Experiment haben die Teilnehmer die
Möglichkeit genutzt, die Konsequenzen ihrer Entscheidungen für
die Rezipienten unbekannt zu lassen oder die Verantwortung dafür
mit einem anderen Teilnehmer oder mit dem Computer zu teilen.
Das Resultat: viel mehr Teilnehmer haben sich für die egoistische
Option entschieden.
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Abbink & Herrmann (2011) erlaubten den Teilnehmern, die Aus-
stattung der Anderen zu vernichten. Als die Expertimentatoren den
Teilnehmern mitteilten, dass der Computer ungeachtet ihrer Ent-
scheidung die Vergütung der Anderen zerstört, ist die Rate der
Vernichtungen stark gestiegen. Der angegebene Gründ dafür ist die
Möglichkeit, sich hinter der Situation zu verbergen und 'die mora-
lischen Kosten der Bosheit' zu reduzieren.
Die Wirkung von situativen Rechtfertigungen hat den Forschern
geholfen, die gesammelten Nachweise von Großzügigkeit der Men-
schen mit antisozialem Verhalten (wie Neid-gesteuerte Vernichtung
(Casal et al., 2012), antisoziale Bestrafung in Kollektivgutspielen
(Thöni, 2014) oder Bosheit und Wohlbeﬁnden reduzierende Sabo-
tage (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2009)) zu versöhnen.
Selbstbild und ethisches Verhalten
Ethisches Verhalten, das meistens als Reaktion auf die Möglichkeit
von der Lüge zu proﬁtieren modelliert wurde, hat die experimentelle
Wirtschaft mit zwei wichtigen Musterbeispielen untersucht: Sender-
Rezipient Spiel (Gneezy, 2005), wobei man die individuelle Lüge
beobachten kann, und 'die-under-cup' Experimente (Fischbacher &
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) mit der Möglichkeit, die aggregierte Verbrei-
tung der Lüge zu messen. Das übliche Ergebnis in dieser Literatur
ist das Phänomen der 'Lügenaversion', die Widerwillgkeit, die Ge-
winne mithilfe der Lüge zu maximieren. Als Motivation für diese
Widerwilligkeit wurde Rücksicht auf die Anderen genannt: die Men-
schen lügen nicht, um den Anderen nicht zu schaden. Gneezy (2005)
variiert den Verlust durch die Lüge und beobachtet, dass die Rate
der Lüge sinkt, je höher die Verluste der Betroﬀenen sind. Die ande-
ren Studien ergaben allerdings, dass die Widerwilligkeit zum Lügen
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sogar in win-win Situationen vorkommt (Erat & Gneezy, 2012).
Diese Ergebnisse haben die Motivation, die Wahrheit zu sagen, um
den Anderen nicht zu schaden, in Frage gestellt. Erwartungsbasier-
te Erklärung im Sinne von 'Schuldaversion' wurde auch vorgeschla-
gen, um den Umgang der Menschen mit der Lüge zu verstehen. Das
heißt, die Menschen lügen nicht, weil die Anderen erwarten, dass
sie die Wahrheit sagen. Obwohl die 'Second-order beliefs' sich als
relevant für die Entscheidung zu lügen erwiesen haben (Battigalli
et al., 2013), genügt 'Schuldaversion' nicht, die Widerwilligkeit zu
Lügen in den anderen Experimenten zu erklären (Vanberg, 2008).
Deswegen vermuteten die Forscher, dass die Tat der Lüge selbst mit
psychologischen Kosten verbunden ist (Kartik, 2009).
Im Gegenteil zur Wirtschaft, basiert die Erforschung von unethi-
schem Verhalten in der Psychologie auf der Selbstbildsbewahrung.
Shalvi et al. (2011) demonstriert, wie die situationsbedingten Ent-
schuldigungen die Lüge verbreiten können. In dem 'die-under-cup'
Experiment sollten die Teilnehmer das Ergebnis des Würfelns be-
richten, um ihren Gewinn zu bestimmen. Die gemessene Rate der
Lüge war viel höher in der Bedingung, in der die Teilnehmer mehr-
fach würfeln durften. Obwohl die Teilnehmer informiert wurden,
dass nur der erste Versuch für die Auszahlung gilt, neigten sie da-
zu, ihre Lüge damit zu rechtfertigen, dass sie eine größere Zahl bei
den irrelevanten Versuchen gewürfelt haben.
Mazar et al. (2008) analysiert den Eﬀekt von moralischen Er-
innerungen auf die Rate der Lüge. In ihrem Experiment konnten
die Teilnehmer selbst ihre Leistung bei der Aufgabe berichten ohne
bzw. mit einer Erinnerung, sich moralisch zu verhalten, bekommen
zu haben. Die Autoren der Studie schlussfolgerten, dass die Erin-
nerungen an die moralischen Standards, die Ehrlichkeit erhöhen.
Diese Ergebnisse aus prosozialem und ethischem Bereich unter-
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stützen die Annahme, dass die Menschen ihre Standards und die
Bewertungen von Selbstbild an den Kontext der Situation anpassen
können (Festinger, 1962; Konow, 2000; Matthey & Regner, 2011).
Die Identiﬁzierung von den speziﬁschen Eigenschaften der Um-
gebung, den situationsbedingten Entschuldigungen, die das Niveau
von ethischem und prosozialem Verhalten beinﬂussen, ist das große
Forschungsziel dieser Doktorarbeit.
Prosoziales und ethisches Verhalten im dynamischen Kon-
text
Ein Großteil der experimentellen Forschung von prosozialem und
ethischem Verhalten fokusiert sich auf die Motivation der Menschen
in einer vorgegebenen feststehenden Umgebung. Die wachsende Li-
teratur in moralischer Psychologie zeigt allerdings die Wichtigkeit,
das menschliche Verhalten im Laufe der Zeit zu untersuchen. Frü-
her wurden die Menschen als konsistent betrachtet, was ihre mo-
ralischen Standards oder inneren Normen betriﬀt. Die Konsistenz
liegt in Verfahren für soziale Zustimmung, wie z. B. 'foot-in-the-
door' Paradigma (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), wobei kleine proso-
ziale Aktivität die größere prosoziale Aktivität erzeugt. In vielen
Experimenten erzeugte die vergangene (un)ethische Aktivität die
Konsistenz in der nächsten Aufgabe (Gino et al., 2010; Cojoc &
Stoian, 2014; Gneezy et al., 2012a). Mehrere neue Experimente ha-
ben eine alternative Neigung vorgestellt: ausgleichendes Verhalten
oder 'balancing' (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990; Meritt et al., 2010;
Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Laut dieses Ansatzes kann eine schlechte
(gute) Tat in der Vergangenheit mit einer guten (schlechten) Tat
in der Zukunft kompensiert werden. Diese Tendenz hat sich in den
verschiedenen Bereichen wie Konsum, politischer Diskriminierung,
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oder Spenden erwiesen (Kahn & Dhar, 2006; Monin & Miller, 2001;
Sachdeva et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2012b).
Meritt et al. (2010) erklärt zwei mögliche Mechanismen von aus-
gleichendem Verhalten durch die Änderungen im Selbstbild der
Menschen. Laut der Idee von 'moralischem Kredit', verdienen ver-
gangene moralische Aktivitäten einen Kredit, den man später ver-
wenden kann, wenn man sich in einer moralisch umstrittenen Akti-
vität engagiert. Vergangene unmoralische Aktivitäten schaden wie-
derum dem Selbstbild und verdienen moralische Schulden, die man
mit einer späteren moralisch überlegeneren Aktivität kompensiert.
In beiden Fällen erkennt die Person die entstehenden Inkonsistenz.
Der Mechanismus der 'moral credentials' hingegen wirkt so, dass
die für das Selbstbild verdienten Prämien den Menschen helfen, die
Unklarheit über die Sittlichkeit der nächsten Aktivität aufzulösen,
ohne das Gefühl, etwas Unakzeptables getan zu haben.
In dieser Doktorarbeit wurde Nutzen gezogen aus der Verbin-
dung zwischen den vergangenen und zukünftigen Aktivitäten und
die Experimenten wurden so gebaut, dass der dynamische Charak-
ter des entstehenden prosozialen und ethischen Verhaltens weiter
untersucht werden kann.
Rahmen und die hauptsächlichen Ergebnisse der
Studien
Der Einﬂuss von ex-post Information auf die Spenden in
einem Diktatorspiel mit einer unvollständigen Information
Kapitel 2 dieser Doktorarbeit (basierend auf einem 'single-author'
Projekt) bereichert die Diskussion über das Selbstbild im proso-
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zialen Verhalten, indem der Eﬀekt von ex-post Informationen auf
Spenden in einem Diktatorspiel untersucht wurde. Das Experiment
in diesem Kapitel wurde so aufgebaut, um die folgende Situation
zu modellieren. Geber haben oft keine Möglichkeit, ex-ante zu iden-
tiﬁzieren, ob die Rezipienten, die um Hilfe bitten, in der Realität
in Not sind. In dieser Situation können die Geber ihre Spenden
reduzieren, weil sie befürchten, dass ihre Hilfe missbraucht wird.
Das Resultat: die Rezipienten, die wirklich in Not sind, bekommen
weniger. Im Experiment manipuliert man die ex-post Information
über die Ausstattung der Rezipienten, die die Geber erhalten, um
mehr über das Verhalten des Gebers zu entdecken. Einerseits kann
die Möglichkeit, unwissend zu bleiben, die Spenden erhöhen, wobei
die Geber die psychologischen Kosten, dem 'Falschen' zu helfen,
vermeiden können (positive Seite von Unwissenheit). Andererseits
kann keine Information den Gebern helfen, ihre Spenden zu redu-
zieren und ein positives Selbstbild zu behalten (negative Seite von
Unwissenheit). Daraufhin erwarten wir, dass ex-post Infromation
die Spenden beeinﬂusst und dass die Geber die Möglichkeit nutzen,
nicht zu wissen, was in der Realität die Ausstattung der Rezipienten
ist.
Aufbau des Experiments Ich benutze das modiﬁzierte Diktator-
spiel mit Anfragen und unvollstandiger Information über die Aus-
stattung des Rezipienten. Am Anfang des Experiments machen die
Teilnehmer eine 'real-eﬀort' Aufgabe. Für diese Aufgabe bekommt
die Hälfte der Teilnehmer ('Diktatoren') eine sichere Ausstattung
von 10 EUR. Der Verdienst der anderen Hälfte der Teilnehmer ('Re-
zipienten') ist mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit entweder niedrig (0
EUR) oder groß (6 EUR). Diktatoren wissen ex-ante nicht wie viel
der Rezipient hat. Der Rezipient bittet um Hilfe, indem er eine
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Anfrage an den Diktator schickt1. Die Diktatoren bestimmen den
Betrag, den sie ausgeben wollen, für jede mögliche Anfrage des Re-
zipienten. Der Computer fügt die entsprechenden Entscheidungen
von Diktator und Rezipient zusammen. Als Manipulation wechs-
le ich die Information über die Ausstattung des Rezepienten, die
die Diktatoren nach ihrer Entscheidung bekommen. In Treatment
'Info' erfahren die Diktatoren die Ausstattung der Rezipienten; in
Treatment 'No_info' erfahren die Diktatoren die Ausstattung der
Rezipienten nicht; in Treatment 'not-to-know' konnten sich die Dik-
tatoren (bevor sie eine Anfrage bekommen und entscheiden wie viel
Geld sie ausgeben) entscheiden, ob sie die Ausstattung des Rezipi-
enten wissen wollen. Die ersten zwei Bedingungen mit exogener
Information wurden 'within-subjects' durchgeführt. Die Bedingung
mit endogener Unwissenheit wurde in getrennten Sessions durch-
geführt. Die Teilnehmer agierten in zwei Perioden mit perfektem
'stranger-matching' und keinen Rückmeldungen zwischen den Peri-
oden. Ich habe insgesamt 6 Sessions im Oktober 2014 im Labor des
Max-Planck-Instituts für Ökonomik durchgeführt. 188 Teilnehmer
haben an dem Experiment teilgenommen.
Hauptsächliche Ergebnisse:
 Resultat 1: Diktatoren im 'not-to-know' Treatment haben si-
gniﬁkant weniger ausgegeben; kein Unterschied zwischen den
Bedingungen mit exogener Manipulation der Information;
 Resultat 2: Manche Diktatoren entscheiden sich, die Ausstat-
tung des Rezipienten nicht zu wissen. 25%-46% 'not-to-know'
Entscheidungen zeigen, dass eine signiﬁkante Minderheit von
Dikatoren sich entscheidet, unwissend zu bleiben.
1Der Rezipient kann nach jedem Betrag zwischen 0 und 5 EUR fragen.
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 Resultat 3: Die Diktatoren, die unwissend bleiben, geben we-
niger aus als diejenigen, die die Ausstattung des Rezipienten
erfahren wollen.
Ich schlussfolgere, dass die ex-post Information eine wichtige
Rolle für prosoziales Verhalten spielt. Gleichermaßen zur psycho-
logisch nachteiligen ex-ante Information, die Möglichkeit, ex-post
unwissend zu bleiben, reizt Egoismus an und unterstützt größere
Ungleichheit.
Gegenwärtiger und zukünftiger Eﬀekt von Delegation der
Lüge
Kapitel 3 der Doktorarbeit (basierend auf einem gemeinsamen Pro-
jekt mit Prof. Oliver Kirchkamp) bereichert die Studien von der
Verbindung zwischen prosozialen und ethischen Verhalten, indem
die gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Eﬀekte von Delegation der Lü-
ge untersucht wurden. Unsere Intuition in diesem Projekt stammt
aus dem Unterschied zwischen direkten und indirekten Übeltaten
in moralischer Psychologie. Wir haben angenommen, dass die Mög-
lichkeit zu delegieren, das Phänomen der 'Lügenaversion' stark re-
duzieren kann. Wir testen, wie die Möglichheit, die Lüge zu dele-
gieren, die zukünftige ausgleichende Aktivität beeinﬂusst (die Ten-
denz, die von der 'moralischen Bilanz' Literatur vorgebracht wur-
de). Wir haben erwarten, dass die Delegation der Lüge den Bedarf,
die Übeltat zu kompensieren, vermindern kann.
Aufbau des Experiments In dem Experiment spielen die Teilneh-
mer zu dritt ein Sender-Rezipient Spiel und ein Diktatorspiel. In
dem Sender-Rezipient Spiel agieren die Teilnehmer in Dreiergrup-
pen: zwei Sender ('Spieler 1' und 'Spieler 2') und ein Rezipient
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('Spieler 3'). Der Computer verteilt die Preisgelder für die Sender
(8 EUR) und für den Rezipient (4 EUR) zwischen fünf virtuellen
Kästen und ordnet jede Gruppe einer der zwei Bedingungen zu.
Wir vergleichen zwei Bedingungen (within-subjects): 'Kein Kon-
ﬂikt' und 'Konﬂikt'. Unter der 'Kein Konﬂikt' Bedingung platziert
der Computer die Preisgelder für die Sender und für den Rezipi-
ent in den gleichen Kasten, unter der 'Konﬂikt' Bedingung sind
die Preisgelder für die Sender in einem Kasten und das Preisgeld
für den Rezipient in einem anderen Kasten platziert. Nachdem die
Sender die Verteilung der Preisgelder erfahren haben, werden sie ge-
fragt, welchen Kasten sie dem Rezipienten empfehlen: 'Dein Preis-
geld ist im Kasten x' und zu entscheiden, ob sie selber die Nachricht
schicken oder lieber delegieren wollen. Nachdem beide Sender ihre
Entscheidungen getroﬀen haben, wählt der Computer einen Sen-
der aus und führt die entsprechenden Entscheidungen durch. Falls
der ausgewählte Sender 'delegiert', wird die vom anderen Sender
empfohlene Kastennummer an den Rezipienten übermittelt. Falls
der ausgewählte Teilnehmer 'selber' ausgewählt hat, wird die von
diesem Sender empfohlene Kastennummer an den Rezipienten über-
mittelt. Die Rezipienten erhalten dann die entsprechende Nachricht
(sie werden informiert, ob die Delegation stattﬁndet) und wählen
einen Kasten, den sie öﬀnen wollen. Die Entscheidung des Rezipi-
enten bestimmt die Auszahlung der Teilnehmer in dem Spiel.
Nach dem Sender-Rezipient Spiel werden die Teilnehmer neuen
Dreiergruppen zugeteilt. In dem Diktatorspiel werden die Sender
gefragt, wie viel von ihrem Verdienst im Sender-Rezipient Spiel sie
an den Rezipienten geben würden.
Wir erwarteten, dass die Rate der Delegtion in der 'Konﬂikt'
Bedingung höher ist; dass die Sender, die selbst die Wahrheit sagen,
dazu neigen, mehr zu delegieren als die Lügner; dass die lügenden
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Sender mehr Geld im Diktatorspiel ausgeben, um ihre Übeltat zu
kompensieren, und dass die Teilnehmer, die delegieren, aufgrund
der niedriger Verantwortung weniger Geld ausgeben als diejenigen,
die direkt lügen.
Wir haben 7 Sessions im Labor des Max-Planck-Instituts für
Ökonomik in Jena in November-Dezember 2013 durchgeführt. Ins-
gesamt 204 Teilnehmer haben an dem Experiment teilgenommen.
Hauptsächliche Ergebnisse:
 Resultat 1: Die Häuﬁgkeit der Delegation höher in der "Kon-
ﬂikt"Bedingung ist.
 Resultat 2: Unter den delegierenden Sendern entscheiden sich
mehr, die Wahrheit zu sagen.
 Resultat 3: Das Spenden in der 'Konﬂikt' Bedingung ist höher.
 Resultat 4: Die delegierenden Sender geben mehr Geld als die
direkt lügenden Sender aus.
Wir schlussfolgern, dass die Möglichkeit zu delegieren die 'Lüge-
naversion' vermindern kann. Falls die Sender, die sonst die Wahrheit
sagen, delegieren, ist die Rate der entstehenden Lüge höher. Im Wi-
derspruch zu unseren Erwartungen geben die delegierenden Sender
mehr Geld aus als die Lügner. Wir schlagen vor, dass die Möglich-
keit zu delegieren als Selektion-Device gilt: die Sender mit höheren
psychologischen Kosten der Lüge delegieren und benutzen die Ge-
legenheit, ihre Übeltat zu kompensieren; direkt lügende Sender mit
niedrigeren psychologischen Kosten der Lüge haben keinen Bedarf,
ihre vergangenen Übeltaten auszugleichen. Die direkte Analyse der
Verbindung zwischen der Verantwortung für die Übeltat und dem
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Willen diese auszugleichen, ist ein viel versprechendes Thema für
zukünftige Studien.
Eﬀekt von Aktivität der 'dritten Person' auf moralisches
Verhalten
Kapitel 4 dieser Doktorarbeit (basierend auf einem gemeinsamen
Projekt mit Dr. Matthias Uhl) bereichert die Diskussion über ethi-
sches und prosoziales Verhalten in einem dynamischen Kontext,
indem der Eﬀekt von der Aktivität der 'dritten Person' auf die Ten-
denz, die vergangenen Taten auszugleichen, untersucht wurde. Es
gibt zwei alternative Hypothesen hinsichtlich der Richtung vom Zu-
sammenhang zwischen vergangenen und zukünftigen moralischen
Aktivitäten: laut 'moralischer Bilanz' sind vergangene und zukünf-
tige ethische Taten negativ korreliert, laut 'moralischer Konsistenz',
sind vergangene und zukünftige ethische Taten positiv korreliert.
Die Forschung hat mehrere Faktoren verdeutlicht, die konsistent
oder kompensierendes Verhalten erzeugen: die monetären Kosten
der vergangenen Taten, das Niveau von konzeptualer Abstraktion
(jüngere vs. alte Taten), und der Mind-set (Konsequenzen- oder
regelbasierte Neigung). In diesem Projekt untersuchen wir, welche
Rolle der Mind-set der Menschen für den Link zwischen eigenen
Aktivitäten und den Taten der dritten Person spielt. Wir erwar-
ten, dass die konsequenzenorientierten Menschen die Aktivität der
Anderen als Substitut wahrnehmen und ihre Großzügigkeit entspre-
chend anpassen. Die regelorientierten Menschen, im Gegenteil, neh-
men die Tat der Anderen als Ergänzung. Wir testen diese Annahme
in einem Laborexperiment.
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Aufbau des Experiments Das Experiment besteht aus drei Tei-
len: Recall-task, Diktatorspiel, und die 'real-eﬀort' Aufgabe. In der
Erinnerungsphase werden die Teilnehmer aufgefordert, sich an ei-
genes jüngeres ethisches oder unethisches Verhalten zu erinnern
(between-subjects). Zwischen der Erinnerung und dem Diktator-
spiel erfahren die Teilnehmer, wie viel Mühe sie sich in der letzten
Aufgabe geben müssen. Die Mühe können niedrig (nur wenige Ta-
bellen korrekt lösen) oder groß (viele Tabellen korrekt lösen) sein.
In der Baseline legt der Computer die Mühe fest. Im 'dritte Per-
son' Treatment sind die Mühen von einem anderen Teilnehmer zu
bestimmen. Am Ende des Expriments werden alle Teilnehmer ge-
fragt, das Trolley-Dilemma zu beantworten. Diejenigen, die es ak-
zeptabel ﬁnden, fünf Menschen zu retten und eine Person zu op-
fern, werden als konsequenzenorientierte Personen behandelt. Die
Teilnehmer, die es unakzeptabel ﬁnden, werden als regelorientierte
Menschen klassiﬁziert. Wir erwarteten, dass die Erinnerung an eine
unethische Aktivität die konsequenzenorientierten Teilnehmer an-
reizt, mehr Geld auszugeben (ausgleichendes Verhalten) und regel-
orientierte Teilnehmer dazu neigen, weniger auszugeben (konsisten-
tes Verhalten). Wir untersuchen, wie die negative (viele Tabellen)
oder positive (wenige Tabellen) Tat von einer dritten Person diese
Tendenzen beeinﬂusst.
Wir haben 7 Sessions im August 2014 im Labor des Max-Planck-
Instituts für Ökonomik in Jena durgeführt. Insgesamt haben 218
Teilnehmer an dem Experiment teilgenommen.
Hauptsächliche Ergebnisse:
 Resultat 1: Unsere Manipulation erzeugt konsistentes Verhal-
ten. Die Teilnehmer in der 'unethischen' Gruppe sind weniger
XVIII
großzügig als die Teilnehmer in der 'ethischen' Gruppe. Der
Eﬀekt ist stärker für die konsequenzenorientierten Teilnehmer.
 Resultat 2: Konsequenzenorientierte Teilnehmer reagieren ei-
gentlich nicht auf die Tat der dritten Person, aber die regelori-
entierten Teilnehmer verhalten sich entsprechend. 'Unethische'
regelorientierte Teilnehmer verteilen signiﬁkant weniger, wenn
sie die netagive Tat der dritten Person beobachten.
Wir schlussfolgern, dass der Unterschied zwischen konsequenzen-
und regelorientierte Menschen wichtig ist, um das ethische Verhal-
ten der Menschen zu verstehen. Wir spekulieren, dass die Tat der
anderen als Beispiel für die regelorientierten Menschen wirkt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The only diﬀerence between the
saint and the sinner
is that every saint has a past,
and every sinner has a future
Oscar Wilde
The successfulness of many social interactions depends on peo-
ple's readiness to behave ethically and pro-socially. The willingness
to sacriﬁce one's own interest in the interest of others leads to wel-
fare gains and social progress. Unethical and antisocial behavior,
in contrast, results in unrecoverable welfare losses and destruction.
This thesis includes three laboratory experiments investigating
speciﬁc factors that aﬀect the degree of people's ethicality and pro-
sociality.
This chapter describes the development of the research frame-
work and the summary of the main ﬁndings in the thesis.
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1.1 The research framework for experimental stud-
ies of pro-social and ethical behavior
From outcome-based preferences to self-image concerns
Decades of experimental research in economics brought a large body
of evidence against the pure money maximizing hypothesis of homo
economicus. In a series of stylized experiments (dictator, trust,
public good games) people often sacriﬁce their resources to change
the well-being of others. In late 90s and early 2000s,Fehr & Schmidt
(1999); Ockenfels & Bolton (2000); Charness & Rabin (2002) intro-
duced other-regarding concern and social preferences into standard
utility model. In these new models, people derive utility not only
from their own monetary income but also from their absolute or
relative distance from others. Emerging inequality aversion was
proposed to explain a broad range of behavioral anomalies such
as giving positive amounts in dictator games or rejecting low oﬀers
in ultimatum-like settings. Pure distributional preferences in terms
of monetary outcomes were later augmented with the idea of belief-
dependent behavior: people behave pro-socially since they want to
meet expectations and not only to change the well-being of others.
Guilt aversion paradigm (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Batti-
galli & Dufwenberg, 2007) as a speciﬁc type of belief-dependent be-
havior in psychological games, allowed researchers to directly model
the role of negative emotions from hurting the expectations of oth-
ers. Originally, the desire to meet expectation of others was sug-
gested to explain rewarding trust by keeping promises in a principal-
agent setting. Later guilt aversion was shown successful in under-
standing behavior in a larger class of dictator and ultimatum-like
games. In particular, lower observability, possibility to appear fair
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or to reduce the expectations of others dramatically reduces pro-
social behavior (Gueth et al., 1996; Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009;
Lazear et al., 2012). The social pressure formed by others' expec-
tations behind generosity challenged the assumption of intrinsic mo-
tivation to behave pro-socially. The pressure to behave pro-socially,
however, does not necessarily originate from external, social forces,
as the literature on self-image suggests.
According to self-image theories, in addition to fairness in outcome-
based models, expectations of others and emotions in belief-dependent
models or social-image concerns, people's own behavioral standards,
their identity or self-image determine the degree of their pro-sociality
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Mazar et al., 2008; Benabou & Tirole,
2011; Dana et al., 2007). In principle, people would like to keep
a positive self-image by adhering to their internal behavioral stan-
dards. However, speciﬁc features of the environment may allow
them to justify deviations from their own internal norms and still
maintain their self-image. In other words, 'situational excuses' can
release people from their internal norms and make them pursue a
self-interest action they would otherwise consider inappropriate.
Dana et al. (2007) illustrates the kind of environmental features
aﬀecting the outcomes of social interaction based on the self-image
reasoning. In their experiment, participants in the role of dicta-
tors exploited the opportunity to remain ignorant about the con-
sequences of their actions for the other player or to share responsi-
bility for their decision with another dictator or with a computer.
Abbink & Herrmann (2011) allowed participants to destroy part
of the endowment of others. In one of the treatments, the ex-
perimenter informed the participants that the computer will with
certain probability reduce the pay-oﬀ of their counterpart irrespec-
tive of what they decide. This possibility to hide behind the nature
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or to 'reduce the moral costs of nastiness' doubled the rate of de-
struction.
The eﬀectiveness of such self-image tolerant excuses helped re-
searchers to at least partially reconcile accumulated evidence about
people's generosity with otherwise puzzling ﬁndings of antisocial be-
havior like envy-related destruction (Casal et al., 2012), antisocial
punishment in public good games (Thöni, 2014), spite and welfare-
reducing sabotage (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2009).
Self-image and ethical behavior
Ethical behavior, usually modeled as a reaction towards the pos-
sibility to gain by lying, was investigated in the experimental eco-
nomics literature through two major paradigms: sender-receiver
games (Gneezy, 2005) and die-under-cup experiments (Fischbacher
& Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). In a sender-receiver game, participants with
more information about the state of the world can increase their
payment by sending untruthful message to their counterparts. In
this case, experimenter can observe individual lies. In die-under-
cup experiments, participants are typically asked to self-report the
outcome of a die roll and are rewarded for a higher number. In
this case, by comparing the expected and reported averages the
experimenter can assess the prevalence of lying on the aggregate
level.
The common ﬁnding in these experiments is the phenomenon of
lying aversion or the reluctance to maximize the beneﬁts through
lying. Other-regarding preferences were proposed as a natural driv-
ing force behind the unwillingness to lie: people do not always lie
since they do not want to harm others. Gneezy (2005) varies the
harm to others due to lie and observes that lying rate shrinks with
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the losses to the aﬀected party. Other studies, however, provide ev-
idence of the reluctance to lie even in 'win-win' interactions (Erat &
Gneezy, 2012) challenging the importance of other-regarding con-
cern in decisions to lie. Belief-dependent justiﬁcations in the spirit
of guilt-aversion models have also been proposed to explain lying
aversion: people do not want to lie since others expect them to tell
the truth. Although second-order beliefs are shown to be correlated
with the incidence of lying (Battigalli et al., 2013), guilt-aversion
fails to explain the reluctance to lie observed in other experiments
(Vanberg, 2008). Similarly to the domain of pro-social behavior,
outcome-based preferences or expectations of others do not suﬃce
to fully capture the scope of unethical behavior. These observa-
tions lead researchers to claim that lying per se induces costs which
truth-tellers are trying to avoid (Kartik, 2009).
In contrast to behavioral economics, research on ethical behavior
in psychology appeals to self-image maintenance. In the search of
situational excuses Shalvi et al. (2011) demonstrate how the avail-
ability of favorable counterfactuals can enhance lying. In their die-
under-cup experiment, participants had to report the outcome of
the die roll which deﬁned their payment. The estimated rate of ly-
ing was substantially higher in multiple-roll treatment where par-
ticipants had the chance to roll the die several times. Although
participants were informed that only the ﬁrst roll counts for pay-
ment, they tend to justify their lie by the fact they rolled a higher
number in pay-oﬀ irrelevant trials (justiﬁcation by counterfactuals).
Mazar et al. (2008) analyzes the eﬀects of ethical reminders on the
level of cheating. In their experiment, participants could self-report
their performance on a task with or without being reminded of the
ethical norm. The authors conclude that reminders (by appealing
to one's moral standards) substantially increase honesty.
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These insights in pro-social and ethical domains suggest that
people can adapt their standards of behavior or beliefs about them-
selves to the context of the situation (Festinger, 1962; Konow, 2000;
Matthey & Regner, 2011).
The identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc features of the environment,
situational excuses, that aﬀect the degree of people's pro-sociality
and ethicality is the broad research goal of this thesis.
Pro-social and ethical behavior in a dynamic context
Most of the experimental research of pro-social and ethical behav-
ior focuses on motivations of people in a given static environment.
However, a growing body of literature in moral psychology em-
phasizes the importance of looking at the developments of people's
actions over time. Traditionally, people are believed to behave con-
sistently as regards their moral standards or internal norms. In the
well-known social compliance technique called foot-in-the door
(Freedman & Fraser, 1966), agreement to requests for small pro-
social actions (e.g. signing a petition) increases the likelihood of
their more substantial pro-sociality (e.g. real donations) in the fu-
ture (Schwarzwald et al., 1983). In more recent experiments it has
been shown that previous (un)ethical action induces consistency
in the next task (Gino et al., 2010; Cojoc & Stoian, 2014; Gneezy
et al., 2012a).
A cohort of recent experimental studies have put forward an
alternative tendency: striving for 'compensatory' or 'moral balanc-
ing' behavior (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990; Meritt et al., 2010; Mazar
& Zhong, 2010). According to this view, doing good (bad) in the
past might be compensated by a bad (good) action in the future. In
Mazar & Zhong (2010) experiment participants who purchased in
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a green store cheated more in a subsequent task compared to par-
ticipants from a conventional online store. In their interpretation,
behaving ethically in the ﬁrst stage 'licenses' deviation downwards
in a diﬀerent domain. Exploring 'moral licensing' eﬀect, Kahn &
Dhar (2006) showed that participants who volunteered for a public
project were more likely to buy luxury vs. conventional product
afterwards; Sachdeva et al. (2009) observed more selﬁshness from
participants primed with positive stories about themselves; Monin
& Miller (2001) noticed that expressing justice increases the like-
lihood of future discriminatory decisions. This recent evidence of
socially undesirable inconsistency in moral behavior complemented
'moral cleansing' (transgression-compliance eﬀect), a tendency to
compensate wrongdoing with subsequent better action, observed in
other studies (Jordan et al., 2011; Gneezy et al., 2012b).
Meritt et al. (2010) discuss two possible mechanisms behind
compensatory behavior, moral licensing and moral cleansing, by
appealing to changes in the self-image. According to moral credit
theory, previous moral action earns moral credits that a person then
spends by engaging in a morally questionable behavior. Previous
immoral action, in turn, damages self-image and earns moral debts
that a person then seeks to repair by subsequently engaging into
a morally superior activity. In both cases, a person is aware of
the resulting inconsistency. According to moral credentials theory,
earning bonuses to self-image helps people to resolve uncertainty
about the ethicality of the subsequent action without realizing of
doing anything morally inferior.
The reconciliation of the evidence for consistent and compen-
satory behavior and identiﬁcation of necessary conditions under
which one or the other tendency dominates is the current research
venue in moral dynamics.
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Gneezy et al. (2012a) manipulates the costs of the pro-social
action and argues that the lower the costs behind pro-sociality, the
more is the likelihood of moral licensing, whereas higher costs (by
providing a reliable signal of one's identity) induce consistency. Clot
et al. (2013) further corroborate this intuition. In their experiment,
ﬁnancial rewards for volunteering reduced the scope of licensing.
Conway & Peetz (2012) appeal to level construction theory pro-
posed by Trope & Liberman (2003) and suggest that the level of
conceptual abstraction (distant vs. recent actions) deﬁnes whether
consistent or compensatory behavior emerges. Parallel to goal pur-
suit research by Fischbach et al. (2006), distant (im)moral actions
enhance commitment to a goal of maintaining positive self-image
and result in consistency, whereas recent (im)moral actions signal
progress towards a goal and allow to reduce moral strivings in the
future1.
Cornellissen et al. (2013) propose that the mind-set of people
(outcome vs. rule-based) explains the direction of the link between
past and future moral actions. In their experiment, participants
classiﬁed as outcome-based (willing to pull the leverage in a trolley
dilemma) exercised moral balancing by giving more in a dictator
game after recalling an unethical action), whereas rule-based par-
ticipants (unwilling to pull the leverage in a trolley dilemma) ex-
hibited consistency by giving less in a dictator game after recalling
an unethical action.
The experiments included in this thesis focus on the link between
one's past and future actions and are designed to further explore
the dynamic nature of the resulting pro-social and ethical behavior.
1See also Jordan et al. (2011) for the discussion of how moral behavior relates to goal
pursuit.
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1.2 The scope and the summary of the main
ﬁndings of the thesis
1.2.1 The eﬀect of ex-post information disclosure on giv-
ing in a dictator game with incomplete information
Chapter 2 of this thesis (based on a single-author project) con-
tributes to the discussion of self-image concerns in pro-social behav-
ior by investigating the eﬀect of ex-post information disclosure on a
giving in a dictator game. The experiment described in this chap-
ter is modeled to reﬂect the following situation. Donors approached
with the donation request often have no possibility to ex-ante iden-
tify if the recipient is in a true need or not. In such an environment,
donors might reduce their willingness to donate to avoid the possi-
bility that their help is misdirected. As a result, the recipients with
a true need do not receive necessary help. I manipulate the ex-post
information disclosure of recipient's endowment to get more insights
about donor's behavior. The opportunity to remain ignorant can
help donors to increase their transfers by avoiding the psychological
costs of helping the wrong' recipient (positive eﬀect of ignorance).
However, no information disclosure can help donors to reduce their
transfers while maintaining positive self-image (negative eﬀect of
ignorance). I hypothesize that ex-post information disclosure af-
fects dictator's giving and that participants employ the possibility
to remain ignorant about recipient's endowment.
Experimental Design I employ a modiﬁed dictator game with re-
quests and incomplete information about recipient's endowment.
At the beginning of the experiment participants perform a real-
eﬀort task. For completion of this task half of the participants
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receive a sure endowment of 10 EUR (Dictators), the earnings of
the other half of the participants (Recipients) are either low (0
EUR) or high (6 EUR) with equal probability. Dictators do not
know ex-ante how much the recipient has. The recipient asks for
help by indicating the amount he requests from the dictator2. Dic-
tators specify the amount they want to transfer for each possible
request from the recipient; the computer then matches recipient's
and dictator's choices.
The treatment manipulation is the ex-post information about
the true endowment of the recipient dictators receive after they
have made their decisions. In Treatment 'info', dictators learn the
true endowment of the recipient at the end of the experiment. In
Treatment 'no_info' dictators never learn the true endowment of
the recipient. In Treatment 'not-to-know', dictators can choose
(before sending the money to the recipient) if they want to receive
ex-post information about the true endowment of the recipient.
First two treatments with exogenous ex-post disclosure manipu-
lation were run within-subjects; the treatment with optional igno-
rance is run in separate sessions. Participants interacted over two
periods with perfect stranger matching and no feedback between
periods. I ran 6 experimental sessions in October 2014 in the labo-
ratory of the Max Planck Institute for Economics in Jena. In total
188 participants took part in the experiment.
Main ﬁndings:
 Result 1: Dictators in 'not-to-know' treatment shared signiﬁ-
cantly less; no diﬀerence between treatments with and without
exogenous ex-post information disclosure;
2Recipients could ask for any amount between 0 and 5 EUR or choose not to send any
request at all.
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 Result 2: Dictators do choose to remain ignorant about recip-
ients' endowment. The frequency of 25%-46% 'not-to-know'
choices shows that a signiﬁcant minority of dictators choose to
remain ex-post ignorant about recipient's endowment.
 Result 3: Those dictators who choose not to receive the in-
formation about recipient's endowment share signiﬁcantly less
than those who choose to reveal.
These ﬁndings show that the ex-post information disclosure plays
an important role in participant's pro-social behavior. Similarly to
psychologically disadvantageous ex-ante information (in the spirit
of moral wiggle room experiments), the possibility to remain ex-
post ignorant to recipient's endowment enhances selﬁshness and
sustains higher inequality.
1.2.2 Current and future eﬀects of delegation of lying
Chapter 3 of the thesis (based on a joint project with Prof. Oliver
Kirchkamp) contributes to the studies on the link between pro-
social and ethical behavior by investigating current and future ef-
fects of possibility to delegate lying.
We build our intuition on the distinction between direct and indi-
rect wrongdoing in moral psychology and argue that the possibility
to delegate might signiﬁcantly reduce the scope of lying aversion.
We also test how the delegation of lies aﬀects subsequent com-
pensatory behavior, the tendency suggested by moral balancing lit-
erature. We expected that delegation of lying reduces the need to
compensate one's wrongdoing which manifests itself in lower shar-
ing in a dictator game.
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Experimental Design In the experiment participants play a three-
person sender-receiver game followed by a dictator game. In the
sender-receiver game, participants interact in groups of three: two
`senders' (player 1 and player 2) and one `receiver' (player 3). The
computer randomly allocates a ﬁxed prize for the senders (80 ECU)
and the receiver (40 ECU) among ﬁve virtual boxes and assigns each
group to one of the two experimental conditions.
We compare two conditions: no conﬂict and conﬂict (within-
subjects). In the no conﬂict condition, the monetary prizes for the
senders and the receiver are placed in the same box; in the conﬂict
condition, the prizes for the senders are placed in one box, and the
prize for the receiver is placed in a diﬀerent box.
After learning the allocation of prizes to boxes, senders are asked
to specify the number of the box they advise receiver to open: Your
prize is in Box x and to indicate if they would like to send the
message themselves or to delegate (the word `delegate' is not used
in the instructions). After both senders have made their decisions,
one of them is selected randomly and this sender's decision is imple-
mented. If the selected sender has chosen to delegate, the number
of the box advised by the other sender is sent to the receiver; if the
selected player has chosen `myself', the number of the box selected
by this sender is sent.
Receivers then receive the message from one of the senders and
are asked to choose a box they want to open3. The decision of the
receiver deﬁnes the payment of the participants in the game.
In the dictator game, senders are asked how much of their earn-
ings they would like to share with a new receiver.
We expected that the frequency of delegation is higher in the
3Receivers know if the delegation takes place.
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conﬂict condition (where there is a need to lie), that senders who
tell the truth themselves are more likely to delegate than liars, that
senders who lie share more in the dictator game to compensate their
wrongdoing, and that those who delegate share less that senders
who lie directly due to lower responsibility.
We ran 7 experimental sessions in Experimental Laboratory of
Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena in November-December
2013. In total 204 participants took part in the experiment.
Main ﬁndings:
 Result 1: The frequency of delegation in Conﬂict condition
is signiﬁcantly higher.
 Result 2: Among those senders who delegate more choose to
tell the truth themselves.
 Result 3: Sharing in Conﬂict condition in higher.
 Result 4: Senders who delegate share more than senders who
lie directly.
We conclude that delegation possibility might indeed decrease
the scope of lying aversion. If senders who otherwise tell the truth
choose to delegate, the incidence of lying under delegation can be
higher. Contrary to our intuition, senders who delegate the choice
and are objectively less responsible for lying share more in the dic-
tator game. We suggest that the delegation possibility serve as a
screening device: senders with higher psychological costs of lying
delegate and then use the chance to compensate their wrongdoing,
whereas direct liars have lower psychological costs of lying and feel
no need to balance their past transgression. More direct analysis of
13
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the link between the responsibility behind the transgressions and
the desire to compensate for it oﬀers an intriguing venue for future
research.
1.2.3 Experimental analysis of the eﬀects of third-party
action on moral behavior
Chapter 4 (based on a joint project with Dr. Matthias Uhl) con-
tributes to the discussion of pro-social and ethical behavior over
time by investigating the eﬀects of a third-party action on the peo-
ple's tendency to compensate their past actions. There are two
opposing hypotheses about the direction of the link between past
and future behavior: according to moral balancing, past and future
actions are negatively associated, according to moral consistency,
past and future actions are positively associated. Research has
identiﬁed several factors determining whether balancing or consis-
tent behavior emerges: monetary costs of previous actions, level of
conceptual abstractions (recent vs. distant acts), and the mind-set
(outcome vs. rule-based) predisposition. In this project we inves-
tigate if the mind-set categorization is important in understanding
the link between one's own act and the action of the third party. We
expect that outcome-minded participant react to actions of others
as to substitutes and reduce their subsequent generosity in case they
face a good deed by others, whereas rule-based participants react
to actions of others as complements and decrease their generosity
once they face a bad deed by others. The experiment provided in
this chapter tests these propositions.
Experimental Design The experiment consists of three parts: re-
call task, dictator game, and real-eﬀort task. In the recall stage,
14
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participants are instructed to recall either their recent ethical or
their recent unethical action (between-subjects). Between the re-
call and the dictator game, participants are informed about the
amount of eﬀorts they will have to exert in the real-eﬀort task at
the end of the experiment. The amount of eﬀorts can be 'low' (only
a few tables to solve) or 'high' (a large number of tables to solve).
In the baseline, the amount of eﬀorts is deﬁned by the computer.
In the 'third party' treatment, the amount of eﬀorts is deﬁned by
another participant. At the end of the experiment participants
had to resolve a standard trolley dilemma: those who state it is
appropriate to pull the leverage and save ﬁve people by sacriﬁc-
ing one person are treated as 'outcome-based' and those who state
it is inappropriate to pull the leverage are treated as 'rule-based'
participants.
We expected that recalling unethical action would prompt outcome-
based participants to give more in a subsequent stage (exhibit com-
pensatory behavior) and rule-based participants to give less (exhibit
consistent behavior). We further explore how good or bad action
from the third party aﬀects these tendencies.
We ran 7 experimental sessions in August 2014 in Experimental
Laboratory of Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. 218
participants in total took part in the experiment.
Main ﬁndings:
 Result 1: Our manipulation in the recall task induces consis-
tent behavior. Participants in 'unethical' group are less gen-
erous than participants in 'ethical' group. The eﬀect is more
prominent for out-come based participants.
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 Result 2: Outcome-based participants do not react to third-
party action, but rule-based participants do. 'Unethical' rule-
based participants share signiﬁcantly less in the treatment.
We conclude that outcome-based vs. rule-based distinction is
important to understand the dynamics of ethical behavior. We
speculate that rule-based participants consider the actions of others
as examples to follow and react asymmetrically stronger to uneth-
ical actions of others.
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The eﬀect of ex-post information
disclosure on giving in a dictator
game with incomplete information
2.1 Motivation
People readily help others in need. However, requests for help might
come not only from sincere recipients who have no money to cover
expensive medical treatment of their children or are unable to repay
debts due to sudden illness but also from dishonest recipients who
simply try to exploit the credulity of donors. If there is no possi-
bility of diﬀerentiation between the types of recipients, this might
severely undermine the willingness to provide help by donors. In
other words, dishonest applicants impose negative externalities on
poor recipients and distort the willingness to donate. The reluc-
tance to help in such environments with incomplete information
might be largely driven by the psychological costs donors bear in
case their help is misdirected. I employ a dictator game with incom-
plete information and manipulate the ex-post disclosure of the true
need of the recipient to study donors' reaction towards donation
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requests.
2.2 Related literature
Asking and giving Donors react to expectations of recipients and
to the requests for help they receive. This tendency is observed
in dictator-like experiments with communication (Yamamori et al.,
2008; Langenbach, 2014) and is often captured by belief-dependent
models like guilt-aversion by Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2007)). The
conclusion from these theoretical and empirical studies is that donors
do not donate due to the dislike of inequality (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Ockenfels & Bolton, 2000) or pure altruism (warm-glow by
Andreoni (1990)) but rather condition their giving on what the
recipients expect and what they ask donors for.
Khalmetski et al. (2013) provide dictators with ﬁrst order be-
liefs of recipients and ﬁnd both positive and negative correlation
between giving and expectations. Andreoni & Rao (2011) allow
recipients to directly 'ask' a dictator for a transfer and observe that
the communication of reasons and numerical requests substantially
increase transfers. Interestingly, when only donors had a one-way
communication possibility they decrease their giving compared to
the baseline, arguably by justifying their greediness. Yamamori
et al. (2008) equip recipients with the pay-oﬀ irrelevant minimal
oﬀer requests and observe intriguing heterogeneity in dictators's re-
sponses: lower requests trigger lower donations, and 'fair' requests
(half of the pie size) often result in perfectly equal allocations; high
('greedy') requests, in turn, are sometimes punished by lower do-
nations. These ﬁndings suggest that asking for a donation is an
eﬀective and sophisticated strategy for the recipients.
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Informational asymmetry Another body of literature suggests that
pro-social behavior is sensitive to various forms of informational
asymmetry. On the one hand, informational advantage of dictators
seem to dramatically decrease generosity (Gueth et al., 1996; An-
dreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Dana et al., 2007; Lazear et al., 2012)
('dark side' of ignorance). On the other hand, informational disad-
vantage is shown to increase trust (Aimone & Houser, 2013) and en-
hance transfers to recipients under uncertain eﬃciency gains (Win-
schel & Zahn, 2014) ('positive side' of ignorance). Interestingly,
the ambiguous eﬀect of ignorance remains under the possibility for
participants to completely resolve uncertainty. In one of the treat-
ments, Dana et al. (2007) allow dictators to choose if they want
to know the consequences of their actions for the recipient ('reveal
the game'). Dana et al. observe that many dictators have chosen
not to reveal the game and that the frequency of selﬁsh choices
increased dramatically under ignorance possibility. In contrast, in
Aimone & Houser's trust game with the possibility for the trustors
'not-to-know' the action (the possible betrayal) of their trustee, the
incidence of trust was considerably higher.
Ex-post information disclosure To our best knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst study of both asking and giving under informational asym-
metry about recipient's need. In such settings, an inference about
expectations of recipients and assessing the credibility of their re-
quests becomes more diﬃcult. Donors can anticipate emotional
disutility from possibly helping the 'wrong' recipient as well as ad-
ditional pleasure of helping those in need. If the psychological costs
are greater than foregone beneﬁts, donors might reduce their do-
nations in such setting. The resulting unwillingness to donate that
we expect resonates with lower trust due to anticipated costs of be-
trayal (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) or more general regret aversion
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phenomenon documented for individual decision making under risk
and uncertainty (Lovelady, 2014).
I suggest that experiencing these extra emotional costs/beneﬁts
begins at the moment of revelation of outcomes and intentions. If
that is true, receiving no information about the true endowment of
the recipient should prohibit emergence of this disutility and help to
increase donations. At the same time, the possibility of ignorance
might help to sustain self-serving belief that the recipient does not
have a need.
I model the need as having zero earnings for a real-eﬀort task
with possibility of sending numerical requests to donors with higher
endowment (Yamamori et al., 2008). In contrast to previous studies
of the eﬀect of the ex-ante information about the consequences
of their action for the aﬀected party, I analyze dictator's reaction
towards the ex-post disclosure of recipient's endowment.
2.3 Research questions
 Do recipients take advantage of informational asymmetry, i.e.,
do highly endowed recipients 'hide' behind the needy and de-
mand larger donations?
 Do donors condition their giving on the requests, i.e, do donors
'trust' the requests from recipients?
 Do donors choose to remain ignorant about the true type of
the recipient?
 How does (the choice for) ex-post disclosure of the true need
aﬀect dictator's reaction towards donation requests?
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2.4 Experimental Design
I employ a modiﬁed dictator game with requests and incomplete
information about recipient's endowment.
At the beginning of the experiment participants perform a real-
eﬀort task: they have to count 1s in a 10 by 10 table and solve eight
such tables correctly. For completion of this task half of the partic-
ipants receive a sure payment of 10 EUR (dictators), the earnings
of the other half of the participants (recipients) depend on the indi-
vidual random draw: a participant receives either low (0 EUR) or
high (6 EUR) endowment with equal probability. The endowment
of the recipients is private information. After the real-eﬀort task
each Dictator is matched with one Recipient.
The recipient communicates to the dictator how much he would
like to receive from him. Recipients can choose to request an
amount X between 0 and 5 EUR (in steps of 50 cents) or choose not
to send any request at all. Dictators choose an amount Y between
0 and 10 EUR (in steps of 10 cents) they would like to send to the
recipient without knowing the exact endowment of the recipient.
Dictators' choices are elicited via strategy method: they specify
the amount of the transfer for each possible request from the re-
cipient; the computer then matches the corresponding recipient's
and dictator's choices and transfers the respective amount from the
dictator to the recipient.
As a treatment manipulation I change the ex-post information
dictators receive about the true endowment of the recipient. In
Treatment 'info', dictators learn the true endowment of the recip-
ient at the end of the experiment. In Treatment 'no_info', dicta-
tors never learn the true endowment of the recipient. In Treatment
'not-to-know', dictators can choose (before sending the money to
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Recipient's
endowment
Ex-post dis-
closure
Treatment "info" 0 or 6 EUR Yes
Treatment "no_info" 0 or 6 EUR No
Treatment "not-to-know" 0 or 6 EUR Optional
Table 2.1: Experimental Conditions
the recipient) if they want to receive ex-post information about the
true endowment of the recipient. The recipients are not informed
if the dictators use this opportunity.
Table 2.1 summarizes the treatments of the experiment.
During the experiment participants' earnings was expressed in
Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and converted into EUR at
the rate 10:1 at the end of the experiment.
For the ﬁrst two treatments I employ a within-subject design.
Participants interact over two periods with perfect stranger match-
ing and no feedback between the periods.
We vary the order of the conditions: half of the groups are as-
signed to "no_info" Ñ "info" sequence; the other half is assigned
to "info" Ñ "no_info" condition in the 1st and the 2nd period
respectively.
Participants are told that one of the two periods will be ran-
domly chosen for payment and that there is 1/2 probability that
the earnings of the recipient will be disclosed.1
At the beginning of the period dictators are informed whether
they will receive the information about the earnings of the recipient
1Neither dictators nor the recipients know upfront that the information condition varies
across periods.
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(once this period is selected for payment); recipients do not receive
this information. 2
The experiment concludes with the empathy questionnaire.
The treatment 'not-to-know' is run with separate sessions. The
instructions are identical to the other two treatments apart from
the possibility of ex-post information acquisition by the dictator.
In each period, before the dictator decides about the transfer, he is
asked if he wants (at the end of 2nd period) to disclose the informa-
tion about the earnings of the recipient (for each possible request).
The recipient is not informed about the choice of the dictator to
reveal his earnings (see instructions).
At the end of 2nd period we elicit unincetivized beliefs of dicta-
tors about the average requests from recipients (dictators are asked
to guess the average requests by low and high endowed recipients);
recipients are asked to guess the average transfer from dictators.
2.5 Hypotheses
I expect that incomplete information setting creates negative ex-
ternalities and diminishes the possibility of requests to be met by
donors:
Hypothesis 2.1. Dictators 'reject' large requests from recipients;
resulting allocations are unequal
If donors reject large requests and treat them as not informa-
tive about recipient's real need, poor recipients have no chance to
improve their well-being by asking for more.
2Since the recipients do not learn the condition they are assigned in a particular period,
this restriction keeps the expected probability of their type to be ex-post discovered constant
across treatments.
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Hypothesis 2.2. Ex-post information disclosure aﬀects giving of
the dictators
Receiving no ex-post information about the true endowment of
the recipient should disable experiencing psychological costs of help-
ing non-deserving recipients. Here I take an optimistic position
and hope that positive side of less information in such an environ-
ment is stronger than the dark side of possible ignorance. Since
the real-eﬀort task should create the moral obligation to help the
poor recipient, we believe that ignoring the requests in our setting
is more diﬃcult than simply ignoring the consequences for others
in the spirit of moral wiggle room experiments.
If ex-post information hurts both selﬁsh and pro-social dictators,
the costless possibility of ignorance should be used:
Hypothesis 2.3. Signiﬁcant fraction of dictators choose not-to-
know the information about the true endowment of the recipient.
The willingness to disclose the earnings of the recipient might
depend on the amount requested. Dictators might be more willing
to reveal recipients' endowment for large rather than for small re-
quests. If the not-to-know option indeed allows dictators to avoid
psychological costs of being exploited, one should observe that:
Hypothesis 2.4. Giving to low endowed recipients in not-to-know
Treatment is higher compared to the full information condition.
If, however, the not-to-know option is predominantly used as a
self-serving ignorance device, one should observe that not-to-know
option does not increase the transfers to low endowed recipients.
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2.6 Results
I ran 6 experimental sessions in October 2014 in the laboratory
of Max Planck Institute for Economics in Jena. The experiment
has been implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), participants
have been recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 188 participants
(94 recipients and 94 dictators) took part in the experiment. The
average age of the participants was 23.4; gender composition was:
59% females and 41% males.
Giving by Treatment
I observed relatively low willingness to share money: on average in
all of the conditions participants in the role of dictators transferred
less than 8 ECU (8% of their endowment) to recipients. At the
same time, only a minority of dictators behaved purely selﬁshly
and transferred nothing for each possible request from the recipient:
23% and 29% in Period 1 and 2 respectively.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the average amounts transferred in each
of the conditions.
As Figure 2.1 shows, dictators condition their giving on recip-
ient's requests. The transfers increase with the amount requested
for moderate requests up to 20 ECU and tend to decline for the
requests above 20 ECU 3. The ex-post information disclosure does
not aﬀect aggregate sharing for requests up to 20 ECU; dictators
in not-to-know treatment give less than in the other two treat-
ments for the range of requests higher than 20 ECU. These ﬁndings
resonate with our Hypothesis 2.1: dictators do not increase their
3The transfer of 20 ECU is pay-oﬀ equalizing donation in case the recipient has a high
endowment of 60 ECU; dictators rarely give more than 20 ECU.
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Figure 2.1: Average transfer by request and condition, ECU
transfers with the larger requests, recipients with low endowment
'suﬀer' from incomplete information setting.
To better understand the diﬀerences in donations across treat-
ments we estimate the following mixed-eﬀects model:
Give  β0   β1dRequest_high   β2dCondition 
β3dRequest_highCondition   γt   ϵi   ϵg   ϵigt
(2.1)
dRequest_high is a dummy which is one when the request exceeds
20 ECU,dCondition is a dummy for treatment,γt is a ﬁxed eﬀect for
period t, ϵi is a random eﬀect for the individual, ϵg is a random
eﬀect for the matching group, and ϵigt is the residual.
Table 2.2 summarizes the estimation results.
For all regressions in Table 2.2 we use the amount of ECU par-
ticipants share as the dependent variable.
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Table 2.2: Mixed-eﬀect regression estimates: DV - amount shared, ECU
all dictators no selﬁsh dictators all dictator:order
Intercept 7.22 8.71 7.81
p1.15q p1.17q p1.51q
request_high 1.22 1.51 1.22
p0.45q p0.59q p0.45q
no_info 0.34 0.35 0.34
p0.45q p0.60q p0.45q
not_to_know 0.45 1.39 1.04
p1.94q p2.04q p2.17q
Period_2 0.28 0.05 0.28
p0.26q p0.36q p0.26q
no_info*request_high 0.69 0.95 0.69
p0.64q p0.84q p0.64q
not_to_know*request_high 2.05 2.80 2.05
p0.64q p0.87q p0.64q
Info_1st 1.18
p1.96q
Num. obs. 2256 1668 2256
Num. groups: i 94 73 94
Num. groups: g 6 6 6
p   0.001, p   0.01, p   0.05
First column in Table 2.2 'all dictators' includes all participants
in the role of dictators, 2nd column 'no selﬁsh dictators' excludes
those participants who shared nothing for each request of the re-
cipient, and the third column 'all dictators:order' includes an order
dummy variable 'Info_1st' (takes value of one if subjects started
with 'info' condition in the ﬁrst round of the experiment).
As Table 2.2 shows, large requests (dummy variable 'request_high')
on average trigger larger donations. Ex-post information condition
itself (variables 'info' and 'not-to-know') does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
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the rate of aggregate giving. However, for large requests (requests
above 20 ECU) participants in 'not-to-know' condition shared sig-
niﬁcantly less. Therefore, our Hypothesis 2.2 about the relevance
of ex-post information disclosure is partially corroborated.
This observation suggests that dictators might try to 'ignore'
large requests by choosing not to receive information about the
true endowment of the recipients.
This brings us to our next hypothesis.
Information acquisition
Do dictators choose not to receive ex-post information?
Figure 2.2 shows the faction of not-to-know choices in each of
the two periods.
0
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Figure 2.2: Fraction of "not-to-know" choices by request, %
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As Figure 2.2 shows, substantial minority of dictators' (from 25%
to 46%) choices is not to reveal the information about the true en-
dowment of the recipient. This supports our Hypothesis 2.3: many
dictators prefer to remain ignorant about recipients' endowment.
Interestingly, the number of 'not-to-know' choices peaks at moder-
ate requests (25-30 ECU), requests which can potentially call for
fair splits. Although the majority of dictators do not condition
their choices of information disclosure on the amount requested,
signiﬁcant minority of subjects 28% (Period 1) to 25% (Period 2)
switch their decision 4.
Figure 2.3 depicts average transfers from dictators in not-to-
know Treatment.
As Figure 2.3 shows, dictators who choose to (ex-post) reveal
the information about the endowment of the recipient transfer more
money to the recipients than dictators who prefer to stay ignorant.
To test if the dictators who choose not to reveal share signiﬁ-
cantly less, I compute individual average amounts transferred across
the requests. I ﬁnd that dictators who (more frequently) choose not
to reveal recipient's endowment shared signiﬁcantly less compared
to dictators who (more frequently) choose to disclose (p.value of
Wilcoxon rank sum test is 0.015)5. Notably, the fraction of selﬁsh
dictators (transferring zero to the recipient in the ﬁrst period) is
three times as large among dictators who choose remain ignorant
(53% vs. 17%, p.value of Fisher exact test is 0.056)6.
4Switching behavior is heterogeneous: some participants start with 'not-to-know' for low
requests and then want to disclose the endowment of the recipients who ask for more than 20
ECU, the others choose to reveal for low requests and then prefer to keep their eyes closed.
5For the purpose of statistical comparison I classify dictators by the majority of their
'not-to-know' choices: if a dictator chose to reveal recipient's endowment for more than
a half of the requests, I classify him as willing to disclose recipient's endowment and as
preferring not to disclose the recipient's endowment otherwise.
6All subjects (6 out of 32 dictators) who chose to ignore for each possible request shared
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Figure 2.3: Average transfers by not-to-know choice, ECU
Truning to Hypothesis 2.4, the possibility of ignorance indeed
aﬀects giving, namely it increases inequality in incomplete infor-
mation setting. I do not ﬁnd evidence of positive side of ignorance
in the experiment.
These ﬁndings suggest that not only possibility of no ex-ante
information disclosure but also ignorance towards ex-post informa-
tion might inhibit pro-social behavior.
nothing with the recipient.
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2.7 Conclusion and Discussion
I analyzed experimentally the eﬀect of ex-post information disclo-
sure on the dictator's giving under incomplete information where
dictators face uncertainty about the endowment of the recipient and
the recipients communicate their requests for the desired donation.
In line with previous experiments, I observe the link between asking
and giving: dictators condition their transfers on how much recip-
ients ask. As regards diﬀerent information conditions, I observed
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of exogenous ex-post information manipulation:
giving in 'no-info' and 'info' treatments is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other. In both treatments dictators increase their giving
for the range of modest requests and decrease their giving for too
ambitious requests.
In the treatment where dictators could choose not to reveal the
ex-post information, the average giving is considerably lower. The
participants who choose not to reveal the information give less that
the participants who want to see the consequences of their transfer.
The analysis of participants reasoning conﬁrms the relevance
of ex-post information. Many dictators report they would like to
balance between the proﬁt and their 'bad conscience'. Some of
dictators indicate they 'hoped' that their recipient had higher en-
dowment and therefore transferred small amounts. However, only
a few dictators indicated directly that they made use of ignorance
possibility: 'Today I wanted to receive the maximum pay-oﬀ and
have decided to give nothing to participant B. I did not want to
see much he asked for so that I do have a bad conscience in case
he asked a little', 'In the ﬁrst part of the experiment I decided to
share as long as I receive the information about the proﬁt of partic-
ipant B... In the 2nd part, however, there was no feedback. That is
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why I decided to give nothing'. The fact that only in 'not-to-know'
treatment dictators are explicitly asked to choose if they want to
get informed might have made this decision more salient compared
to 'no_info' treatment. In exogenous information conditions, dic-
tators seem to be more focused on the reaction to recipients request
(to punish 'the greed') rather than on the ex-post feedback about
recipient's endowment.
I conclude that the ex-post information disclosure plays an im-
portant role in participant's pro-social behavior. Similarly to psy-
chologically disadvantageous ex-ante information (in the spirit of
moral wiggle room experiments), the possibility to remain ex-post
ignorant to recipient's endowment enhances selﬁshness and sustains
higher inequality.
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2.8 Appendix: Experimental Instructions
(Common text for all treatments. Text speciﬁc for 'not-to-know'
treatment is written separately).
Welcome and thank you for participating in the experiment of
the Max Planck Institute for Economics. Please switch oﬀ your
mobile phones and remain silent. All the decisions you make in
this experiment will be treated anonymously. Any communication
between the participants is not allowed. Should you have any ques-
tions during the experiment, please raise your hand, and one of the
experimenters will answer you privately.
For your participation in the experiment you will receive 2.5
EUR show-up fee. In the course of the experiment you can earn
additional money. Your earnings in this experiment depend on the
decisions you make, the decisions of the other participants as well as
on chance. During the experiment your earnings will be expressed
in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) which will be translated
into EUR at the end of the experiment at the following exchange
rate:
10 ECU = 1 EUR.
The course of the experiment
In the ﬁrst stage of the experiment all the participants will be
asked to perform the following task: you will be presented a series
of 10 by 10 tables containing 0s and 1s in a randomized order. The
example of such a table is presented below:
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0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
When you see a table, your task is to compute the number of 1s
in that table. Each participant will have to correctly solve eight
such tables. If the number of 1s you enter is wrong, you will receive
a new table until you accumulate 8 correct answers (you cannot go
back to the same table again).
After completion of the task half of the participants would be
randomly assigned to one of the two roles: Participant A and
Participant B.
Your earnings of the participants for this task in deﬁned as fol-
lows:
Participants A will receive a sure payment of 100 ECU for the
task;
Each participant B will receive either 60 ECU or 0 ECU for the
task with equal probability. (The random draw deﬁning whether
the participant receives 0 ECU or 60 ECU for the task is exercised
by the computer for each participant B individually).
After the computer deﬁnes the payments, the participants will
be informed about their earnings on their screens.
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The experiment will then proceed over two periods.
At the beginning of each period, the participants will be paired:
each Participant A will be matched with one Participant B. Match-
ing procedure guarantees that in the next period no participant will
be matched with the same participant he interacted in the ﬁrst pe-
riod of the experiment.
Participant B will then have the opportunity to communicate to
Participant A an amount X between 0 and 50 ECU he would like
to receive from him. Participant B can ask for 0;5;10;15;..;50 ECU
or choose not send any request at all.
Participant A, without knowing if Participant B has earned 0
or 60 ECU for the task, will have the opportunity to transfer an
amount Y between 0 and 100 ECU to Participant B. Before Par-
ticipant A knows the exact amount requested by Participant B (or
whether Participant B chose not to send any request) he will be
asked to specify the amount he would like to transfer for each pos-
sible request from Participant B. The computer will then match
the amount requested by Participant B and the transfer speciﬁed
by Participant A for that case. The respective transfer speciﬁed by
Participant A will be subtracted from the earnings of Participant
A and added to the earnings of Participant B. (The other transfers
speciﬁed by Participant A for the other possible requests not chosen
by Participant B will have no eﬀect on the earnings). The earnings
of the participants:
Participant A: 100 - Y ECU;
Participant B: 0 + Y ECU or 60 + Y ECU respectively.
After the two periods are over, the computer will randomly select
35
Chapter 2. The eﬀect of ex-post information disclosure on giving in a
dictator game with incomplete information
one of the two periods for payment. Participants will be informed
about the amount transferred by Participant A, the request of Par-
ticipant B and (with 1/2 probability)7 the earnings of Participant
B.
Since both periods have the same chance to be chosen for pay-
ment, you have to decide carefully in each of the two periods.
The experiment will proceed to a questionnaire.
If you read the instructions carefully and do not have further ques-
tions, please click on "Continue".
7In 'not-to-know' treatment instead of 'with 1/2 probability' participants read 'if re-
quested by Participant A'
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Decision Screen for Recipients:
Period 1.
Your role is Participant B.
Your endowment is: 0 (60) ECU.
Endowment of Participant A: 100 ECU.
Please make you decision about the amount of ECU you would like
to request from Participant A.
0 5 10 ... 30 35 40 45 50 no request
Your choice: ...
Decision Screen for Dictators('info' and 'no_info' treat-
ments):
Your role is Participant A.
Your endowment is: 100 ECU.
Endowment of Participant B: 0 or 60 ECU
If this period is chosen for payment, you will (NOT) be informed
about the earnings of Participant B.
Please make you decision about the amount of ECU you would
like to transfer to Participant B.
Participant's B
request:
0 5 10 ... 30 35 40 45 50 no request
Your transfer: ...
Decision Screen for Dictators in 'not-to-know' treatments:
Please decide if you want at the end of the two periods to
receive the information about the earnings of Participant B :
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Participant's B
request:
0 5 10 ... 30 35 40 45 50 no request
Information
disclosure
Yes Yes Yes ... Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No ... No No No No No No
Participant B will not be informed whether you have chosen to
disclosure his earnings.
Please make you decision about the amount of ECU you would
like to transfer to Participant B.
Participant's B
request:
0 5 10 ... 30 35 40 45 50 no request
Your transfer: ...
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Do I care if the others lie?
Current and future eﬀects of
delegation of lying
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Lying brings beneﬁts but comes at a cost. Reluctance to bene-
ﬁt from sending untruthful information in an anonymous setting,
known as lying aversion, is of continuing interest in behavioral eco-
nomics. Many empirical and theoretical studies of the unwillingness
to lie to the disadvantage of others (Gneezy, 2005; Fischbacher &
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Kartik, 2009) want to
answer the question why people are telling the truth: is it a desire
to respect trust, to avoid losses for others, or a mere distaste for
lying per se?
Baron & Ritov (2004); Spranca et al. (1991); Royzman & Baron
(2002) distinguish direct and indirect negative consequences of ac-
tions. They ﬁnd that negative outcomes are perceived as more
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harmful if they are the result of a direct action and as less harmful
if they are the result of an indirect action. We suspect a simi-
lar distinction between the consequences of direct and indirect lies.
People might prefer not to lie. However, they might consider an
indirect lie, i.e. a lie through an intermediary, as more acceptable
than an own lie. As a reason we suggest that people not only want
to avoid the harm or the violation of trust but also want to avoid
the directness of the wrongdoing.
Hamman et al. (2010); Bartling & Fischbacher (2012); Coﬀman
(2011) ﬁnd that delegation reduces responsibility and makes it eas-
ier to reach self-interested or immoral allocations. Still, people
might view delegation diﬀerently ex-ante and ex-post. In line with
Nisan & Horenczyk (1990); Sachdeva et al. (2009); Gneezy et al.
(2012a) we suspect that delegation could inﬂuence people's ex-post
compensatory behavior. After delegation people might be more
ready to cleanse their past wrongdoing.
We study a game where it is possible to delegate the act of lying
and where it is possible to take pro-social actions subsequently. We
examine how delegation aﬀects the outcomes of people's current
and future ethical decisions.
3.1.2 Related literature
Cause and eﬀect of delegation in the positive and the negative do-
main Eﬃciency could be a standard reason to delegate: an agent
could be better equipped with resources, time, or expertise. A dif-
ferent motive has been brought forward by Hamman et al. (2010):
people who are reluctant to implement painful decisions (selﬁsh al-
locations, discriminatory judgments, outright lies) themselves might
ﬁnd that delegation helps them to avoid the disutility from a direct
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harmful act and free them to act in their best interest. Hamman
et al. compare a standard dictator game with and without the
possibility of delegation. Without delegation they ﬁnd a substan-
tial fraction of fair allocations. When delegation is possible, many
principals delegate to agents, and those agents, who are not di-
rectly incentivized for a principal-favouring allocation, act more in
the interest of their principals than the principals themselves. As a
result, delegation substantially increases inequality. Hamman et al.
suggest that shifting (and diﬀusion of) responsibility explain their
result: principals and agents share and thereby reduce the joint
responsibility for their actions.
Bartling & Fischbacher (2012) use delegation as a workhorse to
compare diﬀerent reasons for punishment: outcome, intention and
responsibility. They observe that delegation reduces punishment.
Furthermore, responsibility has a larger impact on punishment than
outcome and intention. In line with Hamman et al., delegation
shifts and dilutes responsibility.
Coﬀman (2011) considers a game which allows to distinguish two
causes for punishment: responsibility and directness of the interac-
tion. In Coﬀman's game responsibility is not aﬀected by interme-
diation. Still (and in line with Hamman et al., 2010; Bartling &
Fischbacher, 2012) Coﬀman observes that intermediation reduces
punishment. Coﬀman can further say that it is the indirect inter-
action, not the shifting of responsibility, which leads a reduction in
punishment.
How intermediation aﬀects the moral cost of a transaction is
studied by Drugov et al. (2014) who use a bribery game. Drugov
et al. ﬁnd that intermediaries facilitate corruption not by reducing
the responsibility for the outcome but rather by replacing a direct
with an indirect link.
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The concept of moral distance from a negative outcome men-
tioned by Drugov et al. is long known in moral psychology. Also the
detrimental eﬀects of indirect action are well-documented for both
self- and other-regarding decisions (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Spranca
et al., 1991; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Hayashi, 2013). Inasmuch as
dictators are held less responsible if they delegate (Hamman et al.,
2010; Bartling & Fischbacher, 2012; Coﬀman, 2011; Drugov et al.,
2014), allocations by omission trigger less blame by the recipients
(DeScioli et al., 2011).
But not only for morally questionable actions, also for desir-
able actions we ﬁnd a distinction between the direct and the indi-
rect. While decision makers prefer to implement unethical actions
indirectly, i.e. through an intermediary, the same decision makers
prefer to implement benevolent activities (generous donations, non-
discriminatory judgments, honesty) rather directly. Patt & Zeck-
hauser (2000), for example, model willingness to attribute positive
outcomes to one's own actions and provide the evidence of `action
bias' in environmental decisions: people prefer actively implement-
ing environmentally friendly policies even though inaction would
lead to better environmental outcomes. Coﬀman (2011) compares
direct (donor-recipient) and indirect (donor-fund-recipient) dona-
tions and ﬁnds that people reward donors much less if they donate
to a cause through an intermediary. Eisenkopf & Fischbacher (2011)
investigate the same reward pattern in a trust game. In their setting
with two trustors and one trustee, delegation by the ﬁrst trustor to
the second one can potentially increase eﬃciency. They ﬁnd that
trustees seem not to recognize that the eﬃciency gain is due to del-
egation by the ﬁrst trustor. Trustees do not reward the ﬁrst trustor
correspondingly.
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Lying aversion and delegation People do not always lie even if lying
secures high monetary reward.
In a seminal experiment, Gneezy (2005) employs a deception-
game to test for (non-strategic) lying aversion  reluctance to get
the outcome through lying. In his setting, a sender learns about the
distributions of pay-oﬀs behind option A and option B and advises a
receiver which of the two options to choose: `Option A (B) will earn
you more than Option B (A)'. Since the senders' payoﬀs are high
when receivers' payoﬀs are low and vice versa, and since receivers
do not know this, senders have an interest to lie. Gneezy compares
choices in deception and in dictator games with equivalent pay-
oﬀs and ﬁnds that the fraction of selﬁsh choices in dictator games
to be higher than the fraction of lies in deception games. Gneezy
concludes that lying is not neutral.
Since then a number of studies on various aspects of lying aver-
sion have appeared (see Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Vanberg, 2008; Fis-
chbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Sutter, 2009). It has been shown
that the expectations of the receiver, the damage from lying, and
the observability of lies shape but do not fully explain preferences
for truth-telling.
Although diﬀerent motivations for lying aversion have been ad-
dressed, it remains unclear whether people distinguish between di-
rect (own) lies and indirect lies (lies by an intermediary).
To shed light on this issue Erat (2013) studies a three-person
sender-receiver game where senders can delegate. Receivers are not
aware of the alignment of interests and receivers do not know who of
the two players sends the message. Erat observes that roughly 30%
of senders delegate the decision. Erat also ﬁnds that an increase in
the receiver's cost of deception does not increase truth-telling but
does increase delegation.
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Compensatory behavior and lying Since senders even delegate when
receivers do not know who sent a message, this suggests that one
motive for delegation might be the preservation of the self image.
In this case deception could also be linked to subsequent compen-
satory behavior of the sender.
According to moral balancing theories (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990;
Meritt et al., 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009) people form a (subjec-
tive) benchmark of acceptable morale and allow for both positive
and negative deviations as long as balance is appropriate. In this
framework, doing extra good (creating a surplus to the moral ac-
count) may `license' a subsequent bad action, and doing extra bad
(creating a moral debt) may be `cleansed' or `compensated' by a
future good deed to restore the account.
Moral cleansing, the desire to compensate a bad action with
a following good act, is sometimes explained within self-signaling
models (Benabou & Tirole, 2011), where individuals with no perfect
access to their deep preferences might `invest' in a bad behavior to
get a signal of their true (good) type prompting higher goodness
in the subsequent task. This reasoning is in line with the approach
to underestimated emotions in economic behavior (Loewenstein,
2000), where moral cleansing may result from underestimation of
the future negative emotions (like guilt or shame). If regret after
lying is higher than expected, the initial choice turns out to be
ex-post suboptimal which requires a compensation.
Gneezy et al. (2012b) discuss how feeling of guilt urges trans-
gressors of the norm to behave more pro-socially. In Gneezy et al.'s
experiment subjects who cheated in a ﬁrst task contributed more to
a charity than truth-tellers. Gneezy et al. conclude that an unan-
nounced opportunity for pro-social behavior right after a transgres-
sion may serve as a conscience cleansing instrument and advises this
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technique for charitable fund-raising.
If people exercise moral balancing, seek to cleanse a transgres-
sion, but account indirect harm diﬀerently, the possibility to dele-
gate lying may decrease the positive compensatory behavior in the
subsequent task.
In this project we want to examine the eﬀects of delegation in
a dynamic setting: ﬁrst, we extend Erat (2013) and study how
delegation aﬀects intensity of lying (current eﬀect); second, we in-
vestigate how delegation of lying aﬀects subsequent compensatory
behavior (future eﬀect).
3.2 Experimental design
Our experiment lasts for four periods. In each period participants
play a three-person sender-receiver game followed by a dictator
game. In period 1 participants did not know about the upcoming
dictator game; in periods 2 to 4 they knew about it. The experi-
ment has been implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), partic-
ipants have been recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). During
the experiment payoﬀs are described as ECU. At the end of the ex-
periment one period is chosen for payment and ECUs are converted
into Euros at a rate of 10:1.
In the sender-receiver game, participants interact in groups of
three: two `senders' (player 1 and player 2) and one `receiver'
(player 3). The computer randomly allocates a ﬁxed prize for the
senders (80 ECU) and the receiver (40 ECU) among ﬁve virtual
boxes and assigns each group to one of the two experimental con-
ditions.
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We compare two conditions: no conﬂict and conﬂict. In the
no conﬂict condition, the monetary prizes for the senders and the
receiver are placed in the same box; in the conﬂict condition, the
prizes for the senders are placed in one box, and the prize for the
receiver is placed in a diﬀerent box.
Figure 3.1 provides the examples of possible allocation of prizes
in the two conditions (Prize i denotes the prize for player i).
Example for an allocation in the no conﬂict condition:
Box 1
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Box 2
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Box 3
Prize 1: 80
Prize 2: 80
Prize 3: 40
Box 4
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Box 5
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Example for an allocation in the conﬂict condition:
Box 1
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Box 2
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Box 3
Prize 1: 80
Prize 2: 80
Prize 3: 0
Box 4
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 0
Box 5
Prize 1: 0
Prize 2: 0
Prize 3: 40
Figure 3.1: Information provided to senders in the two conditions
All players are informed about the two conditions, but only the
two senders know the exact allocation of prizes to boxes; receivers
are told they will be assigned to one of the two conditions with
equal probability and will learn the exact allocation only after they
make their decisions (See Figure 3.2).
After learning the allocation of prizes to boxes, senders are asked
to specify the number of the box they advise receiver to open: Your
prize is in Box x. Together with the number of box they advise,
senders are asked to indicate if they would like to send the message
themselves or to delegate (the word `delegate' is not used in the
instructions). After both senders have made their decisions one of
them is selected randomly (we will call this an eﬀective sender
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Box 1
Prize 1: ?
Prize 2: ?
Prize 3: ?
Box 2
Prize 1: ?
Prize 2: ?
Prize 3: ?
Box 3
Prize 1: ?
Prize 2: ?
Prize 3: ?
Box 4
Prize 1: ?
Prize 2: ?
Prize 3: ?
Box 5
Prize 1: ?
Prize 2: ?
Prize 3: ?
Figure 3.2: Information provided for receivers in both conditions
later) and this sender's decision is implemented: if the selected
sender has chosen to delegate, the number of the box advised by
the other sender is sent to the receiver; if the selected player has
chosen `myself', the number of the box selected by this sender is
sent.
The receiver then obtains a message stating `Your prize is in
Box x' either from sender 1 or from sender 2, chooses a box and,
thus, determines the pay-oﬀs for all the players in the group. In
contrast to Erat (2013), receivers know if the delegation takes place
and learn if they were lied to in the feedback.
In the subsequent dictator game, participants keep their roles,
but groups are re-matched. Each participant meets two other par-
ticipants he or she did not interact with in the sender-receiver game.
Participants in the role of senders do not know what the new re-
ceiver earned in part 1. Senders decide how much out of their 80
ECU earnings they would like to transfer to the new receiver. The
computer then randomly selects one of the two senders and imple-
ments his decision.
Participants repeated this interaction (sender-receiver + dictator
game) for four periods (random matching). Each sender played
twice in each of the two conditions in the following order: C-C-NC-
NC (half of the groups) or NC-NC-C-C (half of the groups), where
C stands for conﬂict and NC stands for no conﬂict condition;
receivers were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions in
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each period.
3.3 Hypotheses
3.3.1 Hypotheses for the sender-receiver game:
Since psychological costs are more likely to arise in the conﬂict
and not in the no conﬂict condition, we expect more delegation
in the conﬂict condition as a means to reduce psychological costs
behind lying.
Hypothesis 3.1. The frequency of delegation is higher in conﬂict
than in no conﬂict.
Let us now look at the diﬀerences in delegation behaviour of
senders who lie and senders who tell the truth. If a sender who
would otherwise lie delegates this sender achieves two things: the
own responsibility and the related psychological cost is reduced
but, since only some delegates will lie, also the expected payoﬀ is
reduced. For a sender who would otherwise tell the truth delegation
also means a lower responsibility but, since at least some delegates
will lie, the expected payoﬀ increases. Delegation would then more
more attractive for senders who tell otherwise the truth than it
would be for senders who otherwise lie.
Hypothesis 3.2. In the conﬂict condition, senders who tell the
truth are more likely to delegate than senders who lie.
3.3.2 Hypotheses for the dictator game:
Truth telling implies no norm violation (but no extra good to license
negative behavior) and thus does not call for moral cleansing. In
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turn, lying is a norm violation and induces negative feelings calling
for cleansing. If our manipulation works and the majority of par-
ticipants lie in the conﬂict condition, we should observe diﬀerent
shared amounts in the dictator game. This hypothesis is consis-
tent with the observation of the lower donations by truth-tellers in
Gneezy et al. (2012b).
Hypothesis 3.3. Senders who have lied in the sender-receiver game
share more in the dictator game than truth tellers.
Since we expect more lying in the conﬂict situation, we also
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3.4. Senders share more in the conﬂict than in the
no conﬂict condition.
Since all players get feedback who actually sent the message,
senders can assess their own responsibility and can distinguish be-
tween indirect and direct outcomes. We expect that compensatory
behavior is sensitive not only to outcomes but also to procedures.
If, as we expect, indirect lying has a lower psychological cost than
direct lying, we will see less cleansing behavior in the case of indirect
decisions.
Hypothesis 3.5. Conditional on the outcome of the sender-receiver
game, senders who delegate share less than senders who lie directly.
3.4 Results
We ran 7 sessions at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute
of Economics in Jena in November-December 2013. In total 204
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subjects participated in the experiment. Sessions lasted for ap-
proximately 50 minutes. The average payment (including show-up
fee) was 7.47 EUR.
3.4.1 Lying and truth-telling
The frequency of truth-telling in the two conditions is presented in
Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Truth-telling by Condition, n=68 in each period
Figure 3.3 shows the relative frequency of truth telling in the
four periods of the experiment. We see a clear treatment eﬀect:
our manipulation had a desired eﬀect on the level of truth-telling.
In the no conﬂict condition, almost all (98%) participants send
truthful messages. In the conﬂict condition only 21% messages
are truthful. We should also note that even in conﬂict not all
senders are lying. Consistent with the literature on lying aversion,
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Figure 3.4: Delegation in conﬂict and no conﬂict
we observe 21% still tell the truth1.
3.4.2 Delegation
Turning to Hypothesis 3.1 Figure 3.4 shows the fraction of senders
who delegated their decision.
31% of all senders in conﬂict and only 10% of all senders in
no conﬂict delegate. For the ﬁrst period, where we can assume
independence of choices, we apply a two-sample test for equality of
proportions and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between conﬂict and
no conﬂict (p-value 0.0034). We, thus, conﬁrm Hypothesis 3.1.
We next turn to Hypothesis 3.2. Figure 3.5 shows fractions of del-
1Although one can argue that some of the choices might be interpreted as revealed pref-
erence over the outcomes (0,0,40) vs. (80,80,0), for example, for strong inequality averse
individuals, lie aversion still seems to manifest itself for a signiﬁcant minority of participants.
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Figure 3.5: Delegation among truth tellers and liars in the conﬂict condition
egating truth-tellers and liars. In the conﬂict condition 47% of
all senders who otherwise tell the truth delegate. In contrast, only
27% or all senders who otherwise lie delegate. This diﬀerence in
behaviour emerges only during the experiment. The diﬀerence in
delegation in the ﬁrst period is not signiﬁcant. To test for diﬀer-
ences between senders who tell the truth and senders who lie also
in the later periods we use a mixed eﬀects logistic model where we
include a random eﬀect for the participant and a random eﬀect for
the matching group.
P pdelegationq  L pβ0   β1dTruth   γt   ϵi   ϵgq (3.1)
Here L is the logistic function, dTruth is a dummy which is one for
truth tellers, γt is a ﬁxed eﬀect for period t, ϵi is a random eﬀect for
the individual, and ϵg is a random eﬀect for the matching group.
β1 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a p-value of 0.027. We
can, thus, conﬁrm Hypothesis 3.2.
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3.4.3 Compensatory behavior
We measure compensatory behavior as willingness to share money
with a stranger in a dictator game. In the following we do not
consider 106 decisions of senders who obtained a proﬁt of zero in
the sender-receiver game. These senders had nothing which they
can share in the dictator game. We still elicited hypothetical deci-
sion for these senders to keep them busy. However, senders knew
their earnings from the ﬁrst round. We restrict our sample to 438
decisions of senders with positive earnings from the sender-receiver
game.
First, we have found a relatively high willingness to share money:
as many as 53.2% of the senders who earned 80 ECU in part 1 gave
away positive amounts to the receiver. Among those senders who
shared positive amounts, the average was 17 ECU or about 21.2%
of the senders' earnings.
Do liars share more than truth-tellers? The average amounts
shared by the senders in the two conditions are compared in Figure
3.6. The two panels in the left part of Figure 3.6 show the ineﬀective
senders, i.e. those which were not selected for a delegation decision
by the computer. The two panels on the right show the eﬀective
senders. In each group of two panels the left one shows the no
conﬂict situation, the right one shows the conﬂict situation.
Interesting are, in particular, the eﬀective players, i.e. those
whose delegation decision was actually implemented. Here in the
no conﬂict case (third panel from the left), all players told the
truth. Shared levels are lower than in the conﬂict case (fourth
panel). In the conﬂict case shared amounts are particularly high
for truth telling players and intermediate (but higher than in the
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Figure 3.6: Average amount shared
no conﬂict case) for liars.
Clearly, telling the truth in a situation with or without conﬂict
are two diﬀerent matters. In our experiment each player experiences
both situations, players either start with conﬂict and conclude the
experiment with no conﬂict or they do just the opposite. To better
understand the impact of the treatments we estimate the following
mixed eﬀects regressions:
Share  β0   β1dTruth   γt   ϵi   ϵg   ϵigt (3.2)
Share  β0   β1dConflict   γt   ϵi   ϵg   ϵigt (3.3)
dTruth is a dummy which is one for senders who tell the truth,
dConflict is a dummy which is one in the conﬂict condition, γt is a
ﬁxed eﬀect for period t, ϵi is a random eﬀect for the individual, ϵg
is a random eﬀect for the matching group, and ϵigt is the residual.
Table 3.1 provides the estimation results. The ﬁrst two columns
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Table 3.1: Mixed-eﬀect regression estimates for Equations 3.2 and 3.3
all, Eq. (3.2) eﬀective, Eq. (3.2) all, Eq. (3.3) eﬀective, Eq. (3.3)
Hypotheses
Truth 1.78 2.21
p0.66q p1.07q
Conﬂict 1.80 2.90
p0.62q p1.04q
Control
Period 1 12.61 13.21 10.75 10.64
p1.07q p1.45q p1.01q p1.34q
Period 2 10.59 10.11 8.73 7.64
p1.04q p1.42q p1.01q p1.37q
Period 3 9.25 10.11 7.25 7.26
p1.06q p1.46q p1.02q p1.43q
Period 4 7.82 7.85 5.95 5.23
p1.03q p1.40q p0.99q p1.32q
Num. obs. 438 219 438 219
Num. groups: i 136 118 136 118
Num. groups: g 7 7 7 7
Proﬁle Likelihood 0.95 conﬁdence intervals in brackets.  0 outside the conﬁdence interval.
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Figure 3.7: Average amounts shared by delegation choice.
in Table 3.1 provide estimation results for Equation (3.2). We ﬁnd
that senders who tell the truth share an amount signiﬁcantly smaller
than those who lie  regardless whether we consider all senders
with a positive income from the ﬁrst round or only the eﬀective
senders. This supports Hypothesis 3.3.
The two columns on the right of Table 3.1 provide estimation
results for Equation (3.3). We ﬁnd that in both cases, all senders
and eﬀective senders, the coeﬃcient for the conﬂict condition is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This supports Hypothesis 3.4.
Does delegation produce less compensation? Figure 3.7 com-
pares the sent amounts for senders who delegate with those who
do not delegate in diﬀerent situations. Most interesting is the third
panel: participants in the conﬂict treatment who lie. In contrast
to our Hypothesis 3.5 senders who delegated share more than those
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Table 3.2: Mixed-eﬀect regression estimates for Equation 3.4
all conﬂict, Eq. (3.4) eﬀective conﬂict, Eq. (3.4)
Hypothesis
Delegation 4.65 p1.78q 5.47 p2.44q
Control
Period 1 9.96 p1.76q 10.69 p2.45q
Period 2 8.39 p1.66q 7.46 p2.38q
Period 3 8.76 p1.60q 9.54 p2.24q
Period 4 6.65 p1.60q 7.27 p2.22q
Num. obs. 204 102
Num. groups: i 128 80
Num. groups: g 7 7
Proﬁle Likelihood 0.95 conﬁdence intervals in brackets.  0 outside the conﬁdence interval.
senders who have chosen to send the message themselves.
To more precisely assess the eﬀect of delegation we estimate the
following mixed eﬀects regression:
Share  β0   β1dDelegation   γt   ϵi   ϵg   ϵigt (3.4)
dDelegation is a dummy which is one for senders who delegate, γt
is a ﬁxed eﬀect for period t, ϵi is a random eﬀect for the individ-
ual, ϵg is a random eﬀect for the matching group, and ϵigt is the
residual. Estimation results are shown in Table 3.2. Regardless
whether we look at all senders in the conﬂict treatment or only
at the eﬀective senders: senders who delegate share, on average,
substantially higher amounts than those who do not delegate. It is
hence not, as we had hypothesized above in Hypothesis 3.5, that
senders who delegate share less. Instead, the delegation opportu-
nity seems rather to serve as a screening device for senders with
diﬀerent psychological costs of lying. Senders with a low cost of
lying don't have to compensate their lies. They neither delegate
nor compensate through sharing in the subsequent dictator game.
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Figure 3.8: Sharing: Eﬀective delegators in the conﬂict vs. senders in the no
conﬂict condition
Senders with a high cost have to use both instruments to reduce
this cost: they have to delegate and, in addition, they also have to
compensate in the subsequent dictator game.
Importantly, participants who eﬀectively delegated sending the
message in the conﬂict condition (have chosen delegate and were
selected by the computer) also shared more than participants in
the no conﬂict condition (See Figure 3.8). To conﬁrm this we
again estimate Equation 3.4 and include only eﬀective senders with
positive earnings from the ﬁrst round. As in Figure 3.8 we restrict to
either `no conﬂict' or delegators from `conﬂict'. Results are shown
in the left column of Table 3.3. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient for
Delegation is signiﬁcant and positive.
To more closely assess the eﬀect of responsibility we estimate
Equation (3.4) again for eﬀective senders with positive earnings
from the ﬁrst round. Now we include only senders from the con-
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Table 3.3: Mixed-eﬀect regression estimates for Equation 3.4
conﬂict deleg./no conﬂict lie delegation
Hypothesis
Delegation 4.69 p1.40q 3.23 p2.33q
Control
Period 1 12.53 p1.27q 8.28 p2.36q
Period 2 10.33 p1.24q 8.09 p2.15q
Period 3 7.64 p1.25q 5.89 p2.08q
Period 4 3.96 p1.26q 5.29 p2.05q
Num. obs. 304 91
Num. groups: i 136 73
Num. groups: g 7 7
Proﬁle Likelihood 0.95 conﬁdence intervals in brackets.  0 outside the conﬁdence interval. Both models
include only eﬀective senders with positive earnings from the ﬁrst round. The model conﬂict deleg./no
conﬂict includes all `no conﬂict' and only delegators from `conﬂict', the model lie delegation includes only
conﬂict and only if the outcome was `lie'.
ﬂict condition where the outcome was lie, either through a direct
lie or through an indirect lie, i.e. through delegation. Results are
shown in the right column of Table 3.3. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
for Delegation is positive, though not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion
We allowed senders to delegate the decision to others with perfectly
aligned interests and informed receivers about this opportunity. Al-
though we create strong incentives to lie directly, a signiﬁcant share
of senders decides to delegate. Among various explanations of why
senders delegate, `distancing from the harm' remains a promising
candidate.
Our results add to the discussion of lying aversion and suggest
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that for some people it is not the losses to the aﬀected party (in
our setting net social eﬀect of lying was positive) but rather the
directness of lying senders are trying to avoid.
In our setting, many senders who prefer to delegate would chose
a truthful message otherwise. This suggests that institutions which
allow for delegation and where delegation looks innocent, could
actually do better if delegation was restricted.
In line with the literature on moral balancing, we ﬁnd that lying
generates compensatory behavior. After a lie participants give away
a larger fraction of their earnings to another player with whom they
did not interact before. Participants who told the truth share less.
At the same time we also observe consistency: participants who are
ready to sacriﬁce money through truth-telling in the sender-receiver
game are also more ready to share in the dictator game.
Perhaps most interestingly, indirect liars (delegators) share more
(and not less) than direct liars if there is a conﬂict between senders
and receivers. As a explanation we suggest that delegation serves as
a screening device: people with a low psychological costs of lying
select into direct lying. People with a high psychological cost of
lying reduce this cost at least partially by delegation. To reduce
this cost furthermore they also share more in the dictator game.
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3.6 Appendix: Experimental Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in the experiment of
Max Planck Institute for Economics. Please switch oﬀ your mo-
bile phones and remain silent. All the decisions you make in this
experiment will be treated anonymously. Any communication be-
tween the participants is not allowed. Should you have any ques-
tions during the experiment, please raise your hand, and one of the
experimenters will answer you privately. No participant will learn
the indentity of any other participant.
Your earnings in this experiment depend on the decisions you
make, the decisions of the other participants as well as on chance.
During the experiment your earnings will be expressed in ECU (Ex-
perimental Currency Units) which will be translated into EUR at
the end of the experiment at the following exchange rate:
10 ECU = 1 EUR.
In addition to your earnings in the experiment you will receive a
ﬁxed show-up fee of 2.5 EUR. Your total earnings (including show-
up fee) will be paid out to privately at the end of the experiment.
Remarks for the experiment
There are three roles in this experiment: Player 1, Player 2 and
Player 3. At the beginning of the experiment one third of the
participants will be randomly assigned to the role of Player 1, one
third to the role of Player 2, and one third to the role of Player 3.
Each participant will keep her role throughout the experiment.
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The experiment lasts for four periods. Each period consist of two
parts. The following instructions describe the procedure in part 1;
the instructions for part 2 will be distributed once you ﬁnish part
1 in period 1 of the experiment. The procedure in Part 1 and Part
2 in each of the periods (unless speciﬁed otherwise) is identical.
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be ran-
domly chosen for payment. Your payment depends on both parts.
Since each period has an equal chance to be selected, please decide
carefully.
At the end of the experiment you will be asked to answer a
questionnaire. Your answers do not aﬀect your earnings.
Instructions for Part 1
At the beginning of part 1 computer forms groups of three partic-
ipants: each group consists of one Player 1, one Player 2 and one
Player 3. The groups will be then assigned with equal probability
to one of the two experimental conditions: Condition 1 or Con-
dition 2. In the ﬁrst period 50% of the groups are assigned to
Condition 1 and 50% of the groups are assigned to Condition 2 of
the experiment.
In the second period, Player 1 and Player 2 interact in the
same condition they were assigned to in the ﬁrst period of the ex-
periment. In the remaining two periods of the experiment (Period
3 and Period 4), Player 1 and Player 2 change the condition so
that each Player 1 and Player 2 participate twice in each of the two
conditions.
Player 3 is assigned to either Condition 1 or Condition 2 with
the same probability in each period of the experiment.
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Before Player 1 and Player 2 make their decisions they will be
informed about which condition they are assigned to; Player 3 will
be informed about the condition he is assigned to only after he
makes his decision.
Participants in both conditions will be asked to make their choices
in the following task. In the task there are ﬁve virtual boxes (num-
bered 1 to 5) that might contain monetary prizes. The value of the
prize is ﬁxed: 80 ECU for Player 1, 80 ECU for Player 2, and
40 ECU for Player 3. The allocation of prizes into boxes depends,
however, on the condition participants are assigned to.
In Condition 1 computer randomly selects one of the ﬁve boxes
and puts the prizes for all the three players into that Box. Please
note that for all groups in this condition it is always true that the
prizes for all the three players will be in the same Box. The other
four boxes will not contain any prizes.
In Condition 2 computer randomly selects two of the ﬁve boxes
and puts the prizes for Player 1 and Player 2 into one box, and the
prize for player 3 into the other box. Please note that for all groups
in this condition it is always true that the prizes for Player 1 and
Player 2 will be in the same box, but the prize for Player 3 will
be in a diﬀerent Box. The other three boxes will not contain any
prize.
The earnings for the three players in the group depends on the
choice of Player 3. Player 3 will be asked to open a box (without
knowing the allocation of the prizes). Before making his decision
Player 3 will receive a message either from Player 1 or from Player
2: 'Your prize is in Box x'.
In contrast to Player 3, Player 1 and Player 2 will see on their
screens the actual allocation of prizes. They will be therefore in-
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formed about the condition they are assigned to. Player 1 and
Player 2 will then be independently asked to specify the number
of the box they advise Player 3 to open: 'Your prize is in Box x'.
Together with the number of Box they would like to advise, both
Player 1 and Player 2 are asked to indicate if they would like to
send my own message or 'the message by Player 2(1)' respectively.
After Player 1 and Player 2 have made their decisions, computer
selects either Player 1 or Player 2 with equal probability and im-
plements his decision: if the selected player has chosen the other
player to send a message, the number of the box advised by the
other player is sent to Player 3; if the selected player has chosen
'my own message', the number of the box advised by that player is
sent to Player 3.
Player 3 then receives a message that says 'Your prize is in Box
x' with the information about who is sending the message. Player
3 will thus read:
'Player (1) 2 has chosen to send the message herself. Player (1) 2
sends you the following message' (in case the selected player has
chosen 'my own message'
or
'Player 1(2) has chosen Player 2(1) to send you the message' (in
case the selected player has chosen 'The message by Player 2(1)'.
Player 3 will be asked to open a box and deﬁne the earnings for
the players in his group.
On the next page you will see the examples of the information
that players receive before making their decisions.
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Example* for the information that Player 1 and Player 2 receive
in Condition 1:
Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 Box 5
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Prize1: 80
Prize2: 80
Prize3: 40
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Example** for the information that Player 1 and Player 2 re-
ceive in Condition 2:
Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 Box 5
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 40
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Prize1: 80
Prize2: 80
Prize3: 0
Prize1: 0
Prize2: 0
Prize3: 0
Information that Player 3 receives in Condition 1 and in Con-
dition 2:
Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 Box 5
Prize1: ?
Prize2: ?
Prize3: ?
Prize1: ?
Prize2: ?
Prize3: ?
Prize1: ?
Prize2: ?
Prize3: ?
Prize1: ?
Prize2: ?
Prize3: ?
Prize1: ?
Prize2: ?
Prize3: ?
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*,** These are only examples for many possible prize allocations.
The exact allocation of prizes in the experiment will be deﬁned as
described above.
After Player 3 has made his decision, all players will be informed
about the following: the allocation of prizes, the message and the
sender of the message Player 3 received, the decision of Player 3,
and the earnings of the participants in their group.
The experiment will then continue to Part 2.
If you have read the instructions carefully and do not have fur-
ther questions, please click on 'Continue'. Before the experiment
starts, you will be asked a few control questions to make sure you
understand the course of the experiment.
Good luck!
Additional Instructions for Part 2
At the beginning of Part 2 of the experiment the computer forms
new groups of three: Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3. Each par-
ticipant keeps his role from part 1 of the experiment. Matching
procedure guarantees that no player is matched with the same par-
ticipant he interacted with in the ﬁrst part of the experiment.
After the groups have been formed Player 1 and Player 2 will be
independently asked how much of their earnings from part 1 of the
experiments they would like to transfer to Player 3. This Player
3 is NOT the Player 3 with whom they interacted in Part 1 but
a new participant that was a Player 3 in another group. Player 1
and 2 can transfer any amount between 0 and 80 ECU (in case the
players receive 0 ECU in Part 1 they will be asked how much they
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would transfer should they have earned 80 ECU). When Player 1
and Player 2 make their decision they know only their own earnings
from Part 1. No one knows the earnings of the other players.
Once Player 1 and Player 2 have made their decisions, the com-
puter randomly selects one of the two players. Only the decision of
the selected player will be implemented and the respective amount
will be transferred from that player to Player 3. The decision of
not selected player (and the decision of players with 0 ECU from
Part 1) will not be implemented. The probability that Player 1 or
Player 2 is selected is equal.
The participants will then be informed about the following:
 the amount that Player 1 and Player 2 have chosen to transfer;
 the randomly selected player;
 the total earnings of all the players in the group.
Part 2 of the experiment is then over.
If you have read the instructions carefully and have no further
questions, please click on 'Continue' to start Part 2 of the experi-
ment.
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Moral Substitutes and Moral
Complements: the Eﬀects of
Third-Party Action on Moral
Behavior
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Moral Consistency and Moral Balancing
The path dependency of ethical behavior is a robust phenomenon
in the psychological literature. The positive correlation between
past and future ethical actions, coined as moral consistency, has
been a dominating paradigm in understanding moral behavior in
a dynamic context. People are believed to exhibit consistency to
reduce the cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), to maintain their
self-image (moral identity models, Akerlof & Kranton (2000)) or to
comply with social norms (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009). "Foot-in-
the door" social compliance technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966) is
a prominent example of utilizing people's longing for consistency in
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a prosocial domain: small donation requests increase the commit-
ment to larger donation requests in the future (Schwarzwald et al.,
1983).
The positive correlation between past ethical actions and the
subsequently shown level of altruism has found support in recent
experimental studies. In Gneezy et al. (2012a) a donation task is
followed by a sender-receiver game. Consistent with the idea of a
foot-in-the door strategy to foster prosocial behavior, they observe
that having just made a small donation increases the level of truth
telling. Gino et al. (2010) prime participants as being of an ethical
or unethical type by merely assigning them original or counterfeit
products. They then study their subsequent morally relevant be-
havior. The authors observe that the participants primed for being
of an unethical type were more dishonest compared to the ethically
primed group. In a recent study, Cojoc & Stoian (2014) combine a
lying task with the possibility of a subsequent donation to charity.
By manipulating the available information about the possibility to
donate, they ﬁnd support for the conscience numbing hypothesis:
the ﬁrst unethical action inhibits the marginal disutility of the sub-
sequent unethical action which ultimately leads to consistent moral
behavior.
As opposed to moral consistency, people may also exhibit a neg-
ative correlation between past and future moral actions, usually de-
scribed as moral inconsistency ormoral balancing, as recent theories
and experiments suggest (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990; Meritt et al.,
2010; Mazar & Zhong, 2010). According to the moral balancing hy-
pothesis, having done good in the past (earning moral credits) can
license transgressions, whereas doing bad (earning moral debits)
calls for subsequent cleansing. Both sides of the proposed com-
pensatory behavior, moral licensing and moral cleansing, have
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found empirical support.
In Mazar & Zhong (2010) participants who bought green prod-
ucts and presumably felt morally superior shared less money in a
dictator game and cheated more towards the experimenter com-
pared to buyers in a conventional online store. After imagining
volunteering for a public project, participants were more likely to
choose luxury instead of necessity products (Kahn & Dhar, 2006) or
cheated more (Clot et al., 2014). Participants primed with positive
words (helpful, generous) donated less compared to a neutral
and negative traits condition (Sachdeva et al., 2009). This could
be interpreted as the dark side of moral balancing, since ethical
deeds in the past license moral transgressions in the future.
Participants, on the other hand, who did not return an extra
payment to the experimenter and presumably went low on their
moral account were more likely to make a real donation to a charity
(Gneezy et al., 2012b). Participants who recalled recent unethical
acts were striving to compensate for it by a higher propensity to
donate or volunteer (Jordan et al., 2011). This behavior could be
seen as the light side of moral balancing, since unethical deeds in
the past are compensated by praiseworthy behavior in the future.
Given evidence for both behavioral patterns, researchers discuss
under which conditions consistent behavior and under which con-
ditions balancing behavior emerges. Gneezy et al. (2012a) compare
costless and costly donations and argue that higher costs provide
a better signal to one's true preferences, thus producing consis-
tency. Conway & Peetz (2012) and Jordan et al. (2011) suggest
that the higher level conceptual abstraction (distant vs. recent ac-
tions) prompts consistency.
Cornellissen et al. (2013) propose an interesting synthesis of both
concepts. They argue that the mind set, being either outcome-
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based or rule-based, explains the direction of the link between past
and future moral actions. In their study, participants are catego-
rized according to their mind set on the basis of a standard trolley
dilemma question. Outcome-based participants tend to balance
their recalled past unethical behavior with a higher subsequent do-
nation in a dictator game and their past ethical behavior with a
lower donation. This is in sharp contrast to rule-based participants
who strive for consistency: they increase donations after having re-
called an ethical act, and decrease them after recalling an unethical
one.
4.1.2 The Eﬀect of Third-Party Actions
As the literature review in the previous section demonstrates, there
is an intense discussion about possible eﬀects of the path depen-
dency of one's own moral actions. The impact of observed moral
actions of a third party on one's own subsequent moral actions,
however, has received less attention. This question is, however, im-
portant since a person rarely acts as Robinson before the arrival of
Friday. She is rather embedded in a nexus of social interactions.
The inﬂuence of social environment on the individual behavior
has a long tradition in sociology. A "broken windows" paradigm
suggests that small damage by others (a broken window, a graf-
ﬁti on the wall) can signal social tolerance towards even further
destruction (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).
Experimental literature conﬁrms that (the information about)
the behavior of others with no stake in the game has a substantial
aﬀect on the behavior of the actors.
Engel et al. (2011) provide pre-play examples of group behav-
ior in public good games. They observe that informing partici-
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pants about highly cooperative groups in previous experiment en-
hances contributions. Similarly, giving participants information
about poorly cooperative groups dramatically lowers contributions.
Rauhut (2013) investigates the eﬀect of positive and negative
examples on incidence of lying. He observes that providing infor-
mation about the rate of lying by others aﬀects the degree of lying
of actors. Participants who learn that the others lie less increase
their truth-telling, and participants who learn that others lie more
seem to overreport more. He suggests that the changes in behav-
ior are due to diﬀerences in prior (and subsequent adjustment) of
beliefs about the social norm.
Providing positive examples is also considered as possible instru-
ment in tax compliance policy toolkit. However, the evidence about
the direction and the strength of these eﬀects is mixed. In some
experiments, observing high compliance rates increases one's own
compliance. In other studies, only negative examples (low tax com-
pliance) have an impact on one's own compliance (See Alm et al.
(2013) for a discussion).
In the moral domain, the presence of third-party actions raises
an interesting question. Benevolent actions by others may lead to
a free-riding problem, where the good actions of others, i.e., pro-
viding help to those in need, substitute for one's own willingness to
behave prosocially Buchanan (1975). This has been referred to as
the Samaritan's dilemma. It can easily be explained by considering
ethical actions as a public good which is systematically underpro-
vided due to the characteristic free rider problem.
An alternative approach would be to consider third-party ac-
tions as non-substitutes or even as complements. Andreoni's idea
of a warm glow that subjects experience when engaging in proso-
cial behavior considers ethical deeds rather as a matter of private
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consumption (Andreoni, 1990). Ethical third-party actions may
then rather serve as an inspiration and accordingly a complement
for own ethical behavior than as a substitute.
We believe that Cornellissen et al.'s elicitation of people's mind
set is helpful in understanding the link between one's own and oth-
ers' moral behavior. Outcome-minded participants may feel that
their own behavior somehow adds to the aggregate consequences
and therefore adjust it in order to compensate for others' under-
 or overcontribution to a moral aim. Rule-minded participants
who are oriented toward following a moral standard will rather take
the observed behavior of others as a norm to follow, thereby aggra-
vating the trend of an under- or overcontribution.
4.2 Research Question and Hypotheses
In a baseline, we reproduce the experiment of Cornellissen et al.
(2013) by priming subjects with an ethical or unethical recall stage,
respectively, in order to investigate whether they exhibit moral bal-
ancing or moral consistency. In particular, in line with their study,
we classify subjects depending on their mind set according to their
answer to a standard trolley problem into outcome-oriented and
rule-oriented participants.
Side Hypothesis: In the baseline, we expect to replicate Cornellis-
sen et al.'s results by observing moral balancing for outcome-based
participants and moral consistency for rule-based participants.
We then analyze, whether third-party actions serve as substitutes
or complements of own ethical behavior. In this respect, we expect
that it is important that the third-party action has moral relevance.
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This is likely to be the case, if it is caused by another human sub-
ject. To control for this, we check whether actions imposed by
random assignment are already suﬃcient to cause a diﬀerence. We
expect that this is not the case.
Control Hypothesis: Third-party actions imposed by random as-
signment have no eﬀect on subjects' own moral actions
We conjecture that outcome-based participants are likely to view
the actions of others as substitutes for their own actions, since they
are mainly focused on the unfolding eﬀects of ethical actions. In
particular, they gain no beneﬁt from executing the action per se
while following a particular behavioral rule. This is diﬀerent for
rule-oriented participants which are likely to consider the actions
of others as complements. Since their focus is on moral standards
incorporated in rules of action, subjects living up to these rules
will be likely to reinforce their own rule-oriented behavior. They
will then be inspired by an ethical third-party action and follow
its example. If that is true, the inﬂuence of a third-party action
on outcome-oriented and rule-oriented participants' moral actions
is systematically diﬀerent between outcome-based and rule-based
participants. To test for this proposition, we inﬂuence the behavior
of ethically primed participants with an ethical third-party action
and the behavior of unethically primed participants with an un-
ethical third-party action. Subsequently, we compare the ethical
behavior after this manipulation with the one observed in the base-
line. Our hypotheses on the impact of ethical third-party behavior
are therefore as follows.
Main Hypothesis 1: Outcome-oriented participants will consider
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moral third-party actions as substitutes for their own actions.
Main Hypothesis 2: Rule oriented-participants will consider moral
third-party actions as complements for their own actions.
Ethically primed outcome-based participants who are confronted
with an ethical third-party action will tend to give less, because
the third party is already acting morally on their behalf. Unethi-
cally primed outcome-based participants confronted with an uneth-
ical third-party action, on the other hand, will tend to give more
to compensate for this third-party behavior. These contravening
tendencies will consequently mitigate the moral balancing eﬀect
observed for outcome-based participants in the baseline.
Conversely, ethically primed rule-based participants confronted
with an ethical third-party action will tend to give more, because
the third party leads by good example. Unethically primed rule-
based participants who are confronted with an unethical third-party
action will analogously tend to give less, because the third-party
serves as a demoralizing example.
4.3 Experiment Design
We employ a 2 x 2 factorial design. The variables that we ma-
nipulated in the conditions of the experiment are current moral
account (manipulated by recalling ethical or unethical act) and the
source of good/bad action towards the participants (other subject
or experimenter). Table 1 gives and overview over the experimental
conditions and the resulting treatments.
The experiment consists of three parts: recall task, dictator
game, and real-eﬀort task. Participants are informed about the
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Chapter 4. Moral Substitutes and Moral Complements: the Eﬀects of
Third-Party Action on Moral Behavior
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Figure 4.1: Flow of the experiment
4.4 Results
We ran seven experimental sessions in August 2014 in the Ex-
perimental Laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics
in Jena, Germany. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007), the participants were recruited with ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). A session lasted approximately 50 minutes, and
the average payment was 80 ECU (10 ECU=1 EUR) (including
show-up fee).
We split our sample into outcome-based and rule-based partici-
pants. Similarly to Cornellissen et al. (2013), the participants are
categorized by their response to a standard trolley dilemma. Those
who said that it was acceptable to pull the lever to save ﬁve peo-
ple and kill one person are referred to as outcome-based in our
analysis. Those who said that it was unacceptable are referred to
as rule-based'.
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4.4.1 Recalling Ethical or Unethical Actions
Overall, we observed a relatively high willingness to share money.
164 out of 218 participants (more than three quarters) shared pos-
itive amounts in the dictator game, while 54 participants did not
share anything. The aggregated average amount shared was 25.4
% of the participants endowment of 10.00 EUR. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the overall generosity found in other dictator game
experiments (see Engel (2011) for a meta-study comparison).
We start by turning our attention toward our ﬁrst hypothesis
and analyze if recalling a recent ethical or unethical action (i.e., an
action with positive or negative consequences for another person,
respectively) had any eﬀect on subsequent giving in a dictator game.
First, we compare the average amount shared and the fraction of
selﬁsh dictators (a subject giving zero in the dictator game) in the
two conditions. The average amount shared in the ethical condition
is 5.00 ECU higher compared to the unethical condition (29.58 ECU
vs. 24.55 ECU, p  0.117 according to a two-sided Wilcoxon rank
sum test).
The fraction of selﬁsh dictators is twice as large in the unethical
condition. In the ethical condition, 7 out of 64 (11 %) chose to
give zero to the recipient, in the unethical condition 16 out of 64
participants (25 %) did so (p = 0.064 according to the Fisher ex-
act test). Given these observations, we conclude that the recall of
ethical or unethical past actions aﬀected the willingness to donate
itself rather than the amount donated.
Figure 4.2 illustrates subjects' reactions to the ethical and un-
ethical recall priming. We observe that outcome-based participants
react moderately to this priming: ethically primed subjects give an
average amount of 29.66 ECU, while the unethically primed ones
79
Chapter 4. Moral Substitutes and Moral Complements: the Eﬀects of
Third-Party Action on Moral Behavior
outcome−based rule−based
E
C
U
*
0
10
20
30
40
50
ethical
unethical
*95%−confidence intervals for the means
Figure 4.2: Average amount shared in the Baseline by condition and mind-set,
ECU
give 22.55 ECU (p  0.093). Rule-based participants, on the other
hand, show no reaction at all: ethically primed subjects share on
average 29.50 ECU, while the unethically primed ones share 27.87
ECU (p  0.767).
As far as outcome-oriented subjects are concerned, these ﬁnd-
ings are in sharp contrast to Cornellissen et al. (2013), since re-
calling a past ethical act increases and not decreases subsequent
giving. Therefore, we do not ﬁnd evidence for moral balancing
but rather for moral consistency in subjects with an outcome-based
mindset. In this sense, not only suﬀering monetary costs (as argued
by Gneezy et al. (2012a)) but also remembering non-monetary costs
might trigger generosity in people with an outcome-based mindset.
Since we expected to replicate the results of Cornellissen, our side
hypothesis is falsiﬁed.
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Figure 4.3: Sharing in the Baseline by the number of tables, ECU
4.4.2 Low and High Eﬀorts by Random Assignment
We assume that the mere amount of tables that subjects have to
solve does not aﬀect their behavior. In particular, if eﬀorts are
simply randomly assigned to the participants, we presume that this
has no signiﬁcant impact on participants' behavior. In this sense, it
is crucial that the third party is taking a deliberate action. Figure
4.3 presents the average amounts shared by outcome-based and
rule-based participants in the baseline where moral connotations
are excluded via a random assignment of eﬀort.
As Figure 4.3 shows, the mere number of tables the participants
have to solve does not aﬀect the amount shared in the dictator
game (p  0.285 for outcome-based and p  0.757 for rule-based
participants according to a Wilcoxon rank sum test). This means
that observing fate or coincidence does not have an increasing
or decreasing eﬀect on moral behavior. Our control hypothesis is
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Figure 4.4: Sharing by outcome-based participants, ECU
therefore corroborated.
This result allows us to pool the data with low and high eﬀorts
in the baseline for the further analysis.
4.4.3 Low and High Eﬀorts by Third-Party Choice
We now turn to analyze the diﬀerences in sharing between the base-
line and the third-party treatment. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 compare the
observed sharing by outcome- and rule-based participants in the
baseline and in the manipulation in which a third party intervened.
As Figure 4.4 shows, ethically primed participants which are
outcome-minded are not aﬀected by observing an ethical third-
party action. They share 29.67 ECU in the baseline and 24.42 ECU
in the third-party treatment (p=0.571, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
Neither are unethically primed participants which are outcome-
minded inﬂuenced by observing an unethical third-party action.
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Figure 4.5: Sharing by rule-based participants, ECU
They share 22.55 ECU in the baseline vs. 25.30 ECU in the third-
party treatment (p=0.377, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
Our ﬁrst main hypothesis is falsiﬁed. Outcome-minded subjects
do not consider third-party actions as substitutes for their own ac-
tions. In fact, third-party actions do not aﬀect outcome-minded
participants behavior in any direction. Thus, outcome-minded par-
ticipants react symmetrically insensitive to moral third-party ac-
tions.
As Figure 4.5 shows, ethically primed participants which are
rule-minded are also not aﬀected by observing an ethical third-
party action. They share 29.50 ECU in the baseline and 33.33
ECU in the third-party treatment (p=0.319, Wilcoxon rank sum
test). Unethically primed participants which are rule-minded are,
however, highly inﬂuenced by observing an unethical third-party
action. They share 27.88 ECU in the baseline and only 13.40 ECU
in the third-party treatment (p=0.028, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
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Our second main hypothesis is partially conﬁrmed. Unethically
primed participants with rule-based mind set consider unethical
third-party action as complements to their own behavior. Ethically
primed participants with this mind set, on the other hand, do not
adjust behavior to the positive examples set by others. In this
sense, rule-minded subjects, react asymmetrically to demoralizing
examples in adjusting their behavior to the negative.
4.5 Conclusion and Discussion
We explored the path dependency of moral behavior by asking par-
ticipants to recall an ethical or unethical task before sharing money
in a dictator game. Contrary to our primary expectations which
were based on the ﬁndings by Cornellissen et al. (2013), we ob-
served a consistent and not compensatory eﬀect of the recall stage
on the subsequent giving in the baseline. Participants recalling an
ethical deed gave marginally more than participants in the unethi-
cal group. Our results concerning the dynamics of moral behavior
therefore resonate with the results of the experiments demonstrat-
ing consistency between past ethical and unethical decisions and
the subsequent prosocial behavior.
In the treatment, we interfered into the dynamics of participants'
own behavior with a good or bad action by others and investigated
how this action aﬀected participants' giving in a subsequent dicta-
tor game. With this manipulation we extent the literature on the
eﬀects of the behavior of others by disjoining the domains of others'
and own behavior. We investigate how the variable of interest, the
amount donated, is aﬀected by the level of eﬀorts set by another
participant. In this sense, we explore the 'generalizability' of ethi-
cal and pro-social behavior across domains addressed in studies on
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negative reciprocity (Houser et al., 2012).
We observed a diﬀerence in responses to others' behavior by
outcome-based and rule-based participants. Outcome-based partic-
ipants did neither react to ethical nor unethical actions that they
observed, and were therefore symmetrically unaﬀected by observ-
ing moral third-party actions. Rule-based participants, on the other
hand, showed a signiﬁcant adjustment to unethical third-party ac-
tions by following their example. These participants treated uneth-
ical third-party actions as complements and accordingly lowered
their own giving in the subsequent dictator game. This was, how-
ever, not the case for rule-minded participants observing an ethical
third-party action. Rule-minded participants are thereby exhibit-
ing an asymmetric reaction to moral third-party action by following
demoralizing while ignoring commendable examples.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the distinction of participants accord-
ing to the mind set as suggested by Cornellissen et al. (2013) is also
useful for understanding how moral actions of others aﬀect one's
own subsequent behavior. In particular, we found that people may
react to the observation of unethical third-party actions, if they
have a rule-based mind set. They are, however, much more insen-
sitive to ethical examples of third-party behavior, irrespective of
their mind set.
The interpretation of our ﬁndings requires certain precaution.
First, the insensitivity of outcome-minded participants might result
from the fact that the intervention of the third-party did not impose
any monetary consequences on the participants. This may be a
reason that the amount of eﬀorts to be exerted seems relevant for
rule-minded participants only.
Another important limitation of the experiment is the restric-
tion of examples to positive for ethically and negative for uneth-
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ically primed participants. It may, for instance, be interesting to
investigate the inﬂuence of unethical third-party actions on people
memorizing ethical deeds. Is the eﬀect of the unethical intervention
suﬃciently strong to inhibit consistent ethical behavior?
We believe, however, that our ﬁndings provide implications for
policy measures based on informing people of socially preferable
or socially condemnable behavior. In particular, the distinction of
subjects into outcome-minded and rule-minded ones might be use-
ful in the tax compliance domain where peer eﬀects have been
suggested to decrease tax evasion. In a recent experiment, Casal &
Mittone (2014) discuss the eﬀectiveness of social blaming (disclosed
identity of tax evaders) in increasing the rate of truthful reports.
Our results call for more precaution. Although psychological costs
of blaming might ex ante prevent potential evaders from cheating,
negative ex post examples might inspire rule-minded individuals
to lower their moral standards and increase dishonesty. The com-
parison of ex-ante and ex-post eﬀects of disclosing the information
about the moral behavior of others oﬀers an intriguing venue for
future research.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Recalled Ethical and Unethical Acts
Typical examples of ethical behavior include helping friends or rel-
atives with moving into a new apartment or transporting: "I have
helped my friend to move in. He had a couple of heavy pieces of
furniture and many boxes...", "I have oﬀered my car to a friend for
moving out, although it could have been damaged", "I have spent
my whole week-end to help a friend to move in, although I had to
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write my home assignment", "I have transported a box with bot-
tles of water with my car for a friend, since she lives on a hill and
has to invest 20 min walking..", "A friend called me at 3.00 in the
morning and told me he missed the last train..". Taking additional
workload (in a shared ﬂat or in the studies) is another common
example of what participants consider ethical: "I have cooked a
dinner for my roommate who called me after a long working day
and cleaned the kitchen afterwards, although that should be her
duty", "I have cleaned the apartment of my friend and cooked for
him, although as his birthday party was. He could better concen-
trate on the studies...", Several participants mentioned their volun-
teering experience: "I volunteer as a tutor for children of diﬀerent
classes and help them to have good grades...", "I volunteer and help
families with severely diseased children...Children from all parts of
Germany have the opportunity to come to Jena and stay in a house
provided by our organization next to the children clinic..", "..I have
helped to load the container with medical equipment for a hospi-
tal in Malawi..." Only a few participants mention direct monetary
donations: "Just before the experiment I gave a change to a street-
musician for his music. I ﬁnd it important to support these people
as long as their music makes the atmosphere in the city more cheer-
ful, and everybody can beneﬁt from it."
The largest class of "unethical" examples are rejections of a help
request with faked reasons: "I was driving to my appointment (app.
13 km). To pick up a friend I would have to make just 2km extra
circle. However, I didn't and told her it was too far away for me",
"I have told my parent in the morning that I could not sit with the
baby since I am sick. Since I have not seen a friend for a long time,
I wanted to chat with him instead...", "I wanted to go home on
Thursday but I had to work until Friday. On Thursday evening I
notiﬁed a boss I am sick, although it was not the case". Small direct
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and indirect stealing is also a common response: "I have stolen a
protein chocolate in a ﬁtness studio. I had to wait long at the
reception and got bored. I wanted to taste it. Besides, they charge
far too much in that studio.", "In a supermarket I have replied to
a question, whether I had 11 buns in my bag with "yes", although
there were 12 of them. No risk, no fun", "We have decided to go
to a birthday party and took a taxi to get there. The fare was
a bit more expensive that we expected. We were six persons and
had to pay 55 EUR. I have given only 6 EUR instead of 9 EUR
and pretended and had no extra money with me.", "I have kept
the money borrowed from a friend to pay my meal. She forgot
that she gave me money and I did not remind her about it", "I
have suggested a colleague not to come to the workplace as if there
was not much to do (we have an hour pay scheme). There was a
lot to do and I worked the whole day and earned more." Selﬁsh
decisions in previous experiments trigger negative feelings and are
sometimes also classiﬁed as instances of "unethical" behavior by
the participants.
4.6.2 Experimental Instructions
(Common text. Speciﬁc text for the baseline and treatment is marked separately).
Welcome and thank for participating in this experiment. Please
switch oﬀ your mobile phones and remain silent. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand and experimenter will answer you
privately.
For your participation you will receive 3.00 EUR show-up fee.
During the experiment you can earn additional money. Your ad-
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mous.
Part 2: Part 2 will be presented to you on the screen, once Part 1
is over. Part 2 is the only pay-oﬀ relevant part of the experiment.
Part 3: In the last part of the experiment you will be asked to
solve certain number of 10 by 10 tables. These tables contain dig-
its 0 and 1 in a randomized order. The example of such table is
presented below:
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Once you see a randomly generated table you have to count how
often digit 1 appears in the table and enter this number (with 1
tolerance). If the number your enter is wrong, you will receive a
new table until you give the right answer. The table is then counted
as solved.
Baseline: The number of tables to solve is ﬁxed for each group:
one group will be asked to solve 1 table and the other group will
be asked to solve 8 tables. You will be informed whether you (and
the other participants) of your group will have to solve 1 or 8 tables
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after Part 1 of the experiment. Actual solving of tables takes place
only in Part 3 of the experiment.
3rd party treatment: After Part 1 of the experiment one par-
ticipant in each group will be randomly selected. This participant
decides whether other members of his group will have to solve 1
table or 8 tables. This participant himself does not have to solve
any tables and makes no decisions in Part 2 of the experiment.
Once you have correctly solved the deﬁned number of tables, you
will have the opportunity to surf in the internet until all the other
participants are ready with the task.
Before the payment begins, all participants will be asked to an-
swer several questions about the experiment.
This will conclude the experiment.
If you have read the instructions carefully and do not have any
further questions, click on 'Continue' to start Part 1 of the experi-
ment.
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Part 2: Instructions (presented on the screen after Part 1)
In this part of the experiment you will be matched with another
participant from you group. In each pair there are two roles: Par-
ticipant A and Participant B. The roles will be assigned randomly.
Participant A receives an endowment of 100 ECU and decides
how much from this amount he would like to give to Participant B.
The amount speciﬁed by Participant A will be deducted from his
account and transferred to Participant B.
Before the participants know if they receive the role of Partic-
ipant A or Participant B, both of them will be asked to make a
decision as Participant A.
The computer will then assign the role of Participant A to one of
the participants and implement his decision. The participants will
be informed about their roles, the decision of (selected) Participant
A and their earnings.
If you have read the instructions for Part 2 carefully and do not
have any further questions, please click on 'Continue'.
Instructions for Judges (presented on the screen after Part 1)
You have an endowment of 100 ECU and can decide, how many
tables the participants in your group will have to solve. The default
that we set is that the participants in your group at the end of the
experiment will have to solve 1 table (8 tables).
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You can change the number of tables they have to solve to 8 (1)
table(s).
If you change the default number of tables to solve, you loose
your endowment of 100 ECU.
If you DO NOT change the default the number of tables to solve,
you keep your endowment of 100 ECU.
Do you want to change the default number of tables?
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5.1 Conclusion and methodological remarks
People's preferences for pro-social and ethical behavior are inﬂu-
enced by a number of situational factors present in everyday social
interactions. The experiments in this thesis identify some of these
environmental features aﬀecting the resulting degree of people's eth-
icality and pro-sociality.
The ﬁndings of these experiments support the importance of 'the
power of the situation' in the domain of pro-social behavior and
call for the necessary pre-caution of categorizing people into types
(for example, by measuring their social value orientation Murphy
et al. (2011)) to understand the outcomes of social interactions. In
other words, the interplay between the environment and the person
produces no 'sinners' or 'saints' but rather people's 'successes' and
'failures' to sacriﬁce their interest to the beneﬁt of others.
Interpretation of the speciﬁc ﬁndings of the experiments, how-
ever, requires certain precautions.
First important question is the degree of external validity. How
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does participant's willingness to delegate lies in a laboratory in
Jena, as shown in one of the projects in this thesis, translate into
the behavior of an employee in a particular bank in Hamburg or of
an expert in an anti-corruption governmental agency in Ukraine?
Of course, Ukrainian anti-corruption agency is very diﬀerent
from the experimental laboratory in Jena in terms of size, actors, or
incentives. The question is how systematic are those diﬀerences. If
one expects that a certain feature of the anti-corruption institution
would make actors behave diﬀerently in comparison to students in
Jena, nothing prevents a researcher from isolating this eﬀect in the
lab. Any ex-ante claims about low external validity of the lab-
oratory experiment remain an unsupported hypothesis. Thus, a
director of anti-corruption oﬃce in Kyiv, can treat the willingness
to delegate in our three-person game by students in Jena as a rea-
sonable working expectation of the behavior of his larger team of
deputies, experts, and social activists.
Another important precaution one should take is that the em-
pirical analysis in this thesis is based on observation rather than on
direct measurement of people's motivation. The work done in this
thesis can be viewed as an attempt to link psychological studies
that help to identify the environmental factors aﬀecting pro-social
and ethical behavior and economic experiments that explore peo-
ple's behavior under real monetary incentives. Although we control
for a number of factors and impose monetary stimuli, we can only
say that certain manipulation produces a particular pattern of be-
havior and cannot identify internal processes leading to this behav-
ioral change. We observe, for example, a larger incidence of lying
when delegation is possible but we are not able to tell much about
the changes in decision making processes or internal motivations
caused by that delegation possibility. In this respect, a user of this
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experimental work would beneﬁt from complementing the ﬁndings
in this thesis by the evidence from relevant studies in psychology
and neuroeconomics.
The last speciﬁc methodological issue concerns the qualitative
discrepancy in the ﬁndings of the 2nd and the 3rd project of the
thesis. In the study on delegation of lies, we have observed com-
pensatory behavior: lying was associated with larger donations in
the subsequent task. In the study on third-party inﬂuence on one's
moral behavior, we have found the evidence for consistent behavior:
an unethical act was followed by lower donations. The divergence
of these ﬁndings is likely to be driven by two methodological diﬀer-
ences between the studies. First, remembering an unethical deed
(chapter 4) and actually performing it (chapter 3) are two diﬀerent
matters. Although the priming used in chapter 4 is shown to evoke
compensatory behavior in other experiments, it might still function
as a mere exposition known to enhance consistency (see Mazar &
Zhong (2010) for a discussion). Second, one-shot (chapter 4) and
repeated (chapter 3) interaction might produce diﬀerent reactions
from the participants. Repeated unethical action might accumulate
more negative feelings and call for a larger compensation. The fact
that in the delegation experiment compensatory tendencies appear
only in later rounds supports this intuition.
5.2 Implications and venues for future research
In the ﬁrst project the possibility to remain ignorant to ex-post
information about recipient's endowment decreased giving in a dic-
tator game with incomplete information. Notably, ex-post informa-
tion disclosure is only relevant when participants had the chance
to choose if they want to reveal recipient's endowment. Exogenous
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manipulation of information disclosure does not seem to aﬀect dic-
tator's giving. These ﬁndings add to other experimental evidence
on increased selﬁshness under ex-ante ignorance (Dana et al., 2007;
Lazear et al., 2012).
Although the possibility to remain ignorant is viewed negatively
because it increases selﬁshness and inequality, it might have positive
eﬀects in settings where selﬁsh behavior coincides with socially op-
timal behavior. One can expect, for example, that less information
about the intentions of others might decrease the incidence of neg-
ative reciprocity known to dramatically damage eﬃciency in many
social interactions. Gueth et al. (2014) allow responders in ultima-
tum game to costly acquire the information about the true pie size.
They observe that only a few responders invest into information
acquisition, and moreover the rate of destructions by responders
for unknown pie sizes are lower. If negative reciprocity is partially
driven by negative social emotions, avoiding certain information
might be strategic for people with strong emotional regulation, as
emotional self-regulation theory suggests (Koole, 2009). If that
is true, (dis-) incentivizing people for acquiring such information
might improve the results of more complex social interactions such
as multi-stage bargaining or contest-like competitions.
The experiment in chapter 2 is the zero-sum situation, i.e., a
transfer from a dictator could by no means change the total social
welfare. It might be interesting, however, to investigate dictator's
reactions towards uncertainty and recipient's requests for help in
cases when transfers could potentially increase eﬃciency. The re-
sults of the experiment also provide important insights into the
behavior of recipients who are rarely completely passive in the real
world in contrast to a stylized dictator game. In particular, the
recipients seem to underestimate the inﬂuence of their request on
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dictator's giving and thus fail to follow an 'optimal' begging strat-
egy. The closer analysis of recipients' readiness to ask for help might
be relevant for improving the design of welfare programs.
In the second project, we have observed that delegation oppor-
tunity might increase incidence of lying. Participants who tell the
truth when no delegation is possible, delegate more often that those
who are ready to lie themselves. These ﬁndings signal that hierar-
chical structures with delegation possibility can be more vulnerable
to dishonesty. In positive domain, in contrast, as other experiments
mentioned in the chapter show, people might underdelegate benevo-
lent activities. Therefore, a policy maker should consider impeding
the opportunity for delegation of socially undesirable or unethical
activities and stimulate delegation where employment of an agent
increases social welfare.
Since both social and self-evaluation of the behavior were present
in the experiment (receivers learned if delegation took place) it is
important to explore the relative strength of these two factors. If
the social evaluation enhances people's willingness to delegate so-
cially blamed activities like lying, would one observe more delega-
tion if the audience becomes larger? Another important aspect of
the study is the link between one's responsibility behind the trans-
gression and the willingness to compensate for it with a subsequent
action. We have found that delegating the decision to lie is associ-
ated with more generous transfers in the subsequent dictator game.
It suggests that lower objective responsibility behind unethical ac-
tions does not necessarily imply lower willingness to compensate.
Future studies can beneﬁt from direct investigation of how the de-
gree of responsibility behind one's action enters into licensing/bal-
ancing behavior. In the project we have focused on the unethical
behavior, however, one should try to extent the analysis for the
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ethical domain. Will the fact the one shares the responsibility for
a good deed with someone else reduce licensing behavior?
In the third project we address the issue of how one's own ethi-
cal behavior interact with the moral behavior of others. We under-
stand that people rarely behave in insolation but often encounter
examples that guide their behavior in a given environment: a ﬁrm,
a school, or a family. We argue that identifying people's mind-
set (outcome or rule-based) is helpful in understanding how people
react on an example of behavior they see. We suggest that this
distinction is useful in a variety of applications. An employer that
builds up a team to work together on a project or a tax authority
disclosing identity of tax evaders in public should be interested in
how the information about others aﬀects the behavior of the actors
they target. We found that rule-minded individuals react asym-
metrically strong to negative action of others: unethically primed
individuals signiﬁcantly reduced their transfers in a subsequent dic-
tator game. In turn, outcome-based participants were symmetri-
cally insensitive to observing behavior of others. These ﬁndings
suggest that negative examples might provoke an increase in un-
ethical behavior among rule-minded individuals, whereas positive
examples do not suﬃce to boost morality.
All three experiments in this thesis are organized along the idea
of self- evaluation of one's behavior. Apart from an observation by
anonymous another participant the social context was deliberately
excluded. Judgment by others, however, is an important feature of
any social order. Therefore, to understand ethical and pro-social
behavior in a richer context, it is important to investigate how
others evaluate and react to (mis-)behavior of actors.
Ndodjang et al. (2013) show that responders were willing to
accept lower oﬀers from proposers who agreed to volunteer for a
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public project. These ﬁndings suggest that higher moral account
earns license from others aﬀected by the decision of the actors.
Social order, however, requires that not only aﬀected second
parties but also third parties unaﬀected by the current interaction
intervene (see Fehr & Fischbacher (2004) for a discussion). In this
respect, the evaluation and costly reaction towards the (un-)ethical
behavior of others by unaﬀected third-parties in a dynamic context
oﬀers another intriguing venue for future research.
The knowledge of how people adjust their ethical judgment and
reaction to the history of actor's choices opens another possibility
to enhance socially optimal behavior.
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